# \[VeBetterDAO Proposal\] Activating Governance - From Lazy Votes to Curated Stewardship **URL:** \ **Category:** VeBetterDAO\ **Tags:** vebetterdao\ **Created:** [January 18, 2026, 12:26pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704 "2026-01-18T12:26:54Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![SunnyLu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/eb9ed0/32.png) [@SunnyLu](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/SunnyLu)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2026, 12:26pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/1 "2026-01-18T12:26:54Z")
# **Activating Governance - From Lazy Votes to Curated Stewardship** Current governance dynamics favor convenience over conviction, resulting in stagnant allocations and low-signal decision outcomes. This proposal introduces a phased upgrade: Phase 1 rewards active participation and intent, while Phase 2 enables transparent, staked Navigators to improve allocation quality through voluntary delegation. Together, these changes aim to unlock smarter capital allocation, faster dApp discovery, and a more resilient governance framework at scale. # **Phase 1: Introducing Freshness & Governance Intent Multipliers** ## **Objective** This first phase introduces two incentive mechanisms - _ **Freshness Multiplier** _ and _ **Governance Intent Multiplier** _ - designed to improve voting quality, enhance governance signal integrity, and ensure that reward distribution better reflects genuine engagement, responsibility, and ecosystem contribution. The overarching goal is to align incentives with meaningful participation, without increasing complexity or friction for users. ## **Problem 1: Lazy Votes in Weekly Voting** ### **Problem Statement** Weekly allocation voting has gradually become highly reward-driven, resulting in widespread “lazy voting” behavior. Many users leave their voting configuration unchanged for long periods, leading to: 1. Allocation outcomes that do not accurately reflect the real quality, innovation, or performance of dApps. 2. Structural disadvantages for new or emerging dApps, which struggle to attract attention or capital allocation. 3. Underutilisation and misallocation of voting power, weakening the overall governance signal of the ecosystem. ### **Analysis** - **Incentive Misalignment** : A significant portion of voters are primarily motivated by weekly voting rewards rather than thoughtful allocation. - **Convenience Bias** : Auto-voting and unchanged configurations reduce user effort, but also significantly diminish the effectiveness and responsiveness of voting power. - **Stagnant Outcomes** : When votes rarely change, weekly voting loses its purpose as a discovery and signaling mechanism. In short, convenience has overtaken responsibility, and voting power is no longer being exercised as intended. ## **Solution: Make Updating Votes Strictly Better** We propose maintaining the simplicity of weekly voting, while making active participation economically superior to passive behavior. The system should explicitly reward voters who: - Regularly reassess and update their voting configuration. - Explore and support a broader range of dApps. - Actively and responsibly manage their voting power over time. ### **Definition: “Update”** An _ **Update** _ is defined as any intentional modification to a user’s weekly voting configuration, including: - Adding or removing one or more dApps. - Changing allocation weights. - Rebalancing percentages across existing dApps. Any of the above actions qualifies as a valid update. ### **Freshness Multiplier** A voter’s weekly voting power is multiplied by a _ **Freshness Multiplier** _, determined by how recently they updated their voting configuration. This mechanism directly incentivises ongoing evaluation and engagement, without forcing complexity: - Updates every week → 3.00× multiplier; - Updates once every 2 weeks → 2.00× multiplier; - No update for 3 or more consecutive rounds → 1.00× multiplier. ### **Expected Outcomes** - Encourages voters to regularly reassess dApp performance and relevance. - Increases exposure and opportunity for new and high-quality dApps. - Transforms weekly voting from a passive yield activity into an active governance signal. - Improves capital efficiency and ecosystem adaptability over time. ## **Problem 2: Ineffective Governance Proposal Voting** ### **Problem Statement** Current governance proposal voting exhibits extremely high abstention rates: - 50-60% of votes are _Abstain_, often coming from over 10,000 wallets. - _For_/_Against_ votes typically come from fewer than 2,000 wallets in recent proposals. At this stage of ecosystem maturity: - Abstain votes contribute minimal informational or governance value. - High abstention artificially inflates participation optics without improving decision quality. - Proposal outcomes are effectively determined by a small subset of voters, despite large nominal participation. ## **Solution: Reward Governance Intent, Not Passivity** Abstain should remain a legitimate governance option, preserving freedom of choice. However, earning proposal voting rewards should require expressed intent. To achieve this, we propose a _ **Governance Intent Multiplier** _ that differentiates between active decision-making and passive abstention. ### **Governance Intent Multiplier** - _For_/_Against_ → 1.00x; - _Abstain_ → 0.30x. **Rationale** - _For_/_Against_ votes represent clear governance intent and signal conviction. - _Abstain_ remains available for uncertainty or neutrality, but with proportionally reduced rewards. - Incentivises voters to read, understand, and take a position on proposals. - Improves the signal-to-noise ratio in governance outcomes. ## **Summary of Benefits** By introducing _Freshness and Governance Intent multipliers_, Phase 1 delivers: - Stronger alignment between rewards and meaningful participation. - More dynamic, responsive, and fair weekly allocation outcomes. - Increased visibility and opportunity for new and high-quality dApps. - More accurate and actionable governance signals. - A healthier long-term foundation for decentralised decision-making. This phase focuses on incentive refinement, not complexity, ensuring adoption remains frictionless while governance quality materially improves. # **Phase 2: Introduction of the Navigator Role** ## **Overview** Phase 2 introduces a _ **Navigator** _ system, enabling users to delegate their weekly voting decisions to trusted, transparent, and accountable Navigators who vote on their behalf. This mechanism is designed to professionalise voting behavior without centralising power, improving vote quality and ecosystem adaptability while preserving user sovereignty. ## **Objectives** The Navigator system aims to: - Improve weekly vote quality and freshness through active, accountable voting agents. - Enhance discoverability of new and high-quality dApps, reducing inertia-driven allocation. - Further reduce lazy voting behavior, while improving convenience for regular users. - Enable professionalised curation without compromising decentralisation or permissionlessness. - Align incentives through staking, fees, and slashing, ensuring Navigator accountability. ## **System Roles** ### **Navigators (Senators)** Navigators are public voting agents who manage delegated voting power on behalf of users, operating under strict transparency, staking, and accountability requirements. **Navigator Requirements** Each Navigator must: - Maintain a public profile including but not limited to: - Provide full conflict-of-interest disclosures, including: - Maintain a minimum stake in the Navigator Pool. - Vote weekly on behalf of users (citizens). - Monitor, audit, and publish a Navigator Report at least once every two rounds, covering, e.g.: ### **Users (Citizens)** Users are individual wallet addresses that may choose to delegate their voting power. User rights and guarantees: - One wallet may delegate voting power to one Navigator at a time; - Delegation can be withdrawn at any time; - Users retain full ownership of VOT3; - Users receive normal voting rewards based on their VOT3 and the Phase 1 multipliers; - Navigator fees are automatically deducted from users’ weekly rewards. ## **Navigator Onboarding & Activation Pipeline** ### **Step 1: Application** Prospective Navigators must submit an application via a Navigator Portal, including: - Public profile; - Voting strategy and principles; - Conflict-of-interest disclosures; - Wallet address; - Fixed Navigator Fee Rate - 20%; - Social Media links… ### **Step 2: Stake Deposit** To activate, Navigators must deposit a stake into the Navigator Pool. #### **Staking Requirements** The required stake is defined as _ **10% of total delegated VOT3** _, subject to the following bounds: - _ **Minimum Stake** _: - _ **Maximum Stake** _: #### **Dynamic Stake Enforcement** - If a Navigator’s stake falls below the 10% requirement (due to slashing or increased delegation), the Navigator must top up. - If delegated VOT3 exceeds the Navigator’s allowed cap: #### **Auto-Removal Condition** - If stake remains below the minimum threshold (50,000 VOT3) for 7 consecutive days, the Navigator is automatically removed. - All delegations immediately become ineffective. #### **Fee Locking** - Navigator fees are locked in the Navigator Pool for 4 rounds. - Fees become claimable only after the lock period expires. ## **Voting Power** #### **Base Voting Power** _Navigator voting power = sum of delegated VOT3_, subject to user-level multipliers. \* No additional base voting power is granted by default. #### **Multiplier Inheritance** Delegated voting power inherits: - _Freshness Multiplier_, based on Navigator rotation behavior; - _Governance Intent Multiplier_, based on Navigator proposal voting behavior; **Example** - If a Navigator rotates allocations every week and casts _For_ or _Against_ votes on proposals (if applicable), then delegated voting power receives: ## **Rewards Structure** **Navigators (Senators)** - Earn a Navigator Fee - 20% of users’ rewards. - Fees are automatically calculated and locked. - Long-term performance and trust drive delegation growth. **Users (Citizens)** - Receive standard voting rewards based on: - No reduction in base rewards beyond Navigator fee. ## **Slashing Framework** #### **Stake Rules** - Navigators must maintain the minimum required stake at all times. - All slashed funds are burned. - Falling below minimum stake for 7 days triggers automatic removal. - Re-entry requires full reapplication. #### **Resignation & Exit Rules** - A Navigator must publicly announce their resignation at least one week before casting their final vote on behalf of delegators. - The Navigator may withdraw the staked funds only after the final vote. - **Example** : If the Navigator announces resignation in Round N, they may cast their final vote in Round N+1 (7 days later) and withdraw the stake thereafter. #### **Slashing Events & Penalties** _**Minor Slashes (Slash 10% of Stake)**_ Automatically executed by protocol rules, e.g.: - Missed weekly votes & proposal votes; - Failure to publish required reports twice within 4 rounds. _**Major Slashes (Slash up to 100% of Stake & Locked Fees + Removal)**_ Applied in cases of severe misconduct, e.g.: - Governance manipulation or bribery; - Vote buying; - Undisclosed paid relationships with dApps; - System attacks… _ **Major Slashing Process** _ 1. _ **Community Monitoring** _; 2. _ **Investigation Trigger** _: An investigation shall be initiated only when a minimum of five Navigators have agreed to lock their stakes. 3. _ **Investigation Period** _: Findings shall be made public upon the conclusion of the investigation within 4 rounds. 4. _ **Governance Vote** _: - A formal proposal determines the final slashing outcome. - Locked stake and fees are burned upon approval. ## **Summary** The Navigator system introduces a market-driven, accountable layer of governance expertise, while preserving decentralisation and user sovereignty. It: - Reduces voting inertia; - Improves allocation quality; - Creates a reputation economy around governance; - Aligns incentives through staking, fees, and slashing. Phase 2 builds directly on Phase 1, transforming governance from passive participation into active, professional stewardship, without introducing custodial risk or centralised control. ---
**Author:** ![Morb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/258eb7/32.png) [@Morb](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/Morb)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2026, 1:28pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/2 "2026-01-18T13:28:10Z")
Phase 1 looks good. Phase 2 needs a lot more discussion over it. Do you plan to publish these as 2 separate proposals? ---
**Author:** ![gstamato](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex017/user_avatar/vechain.discourse.group/gstamato/32/261_2.png) [@gstamato](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/gstamato)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2026, 1:47pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/3 "2026-01-18T13:47:26Z")
I both agree for phase 1 and phase 2. However, to be honest, I NEVER UNDERSTOOD the meaning of ABSTAINING. I would suggest to delete this option. Either you agree or disagree with a proposal. If you do not want to participate you should get zero rewards with the same way when you don’t vote at all. For me x0,30 it’s too much For a neutrality. ---
**Author:** ![DaveL](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/898d66/32.png) [@DaveL](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/DaveL)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2026, 5:22pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/4 "2026-01-18T17:22:14Z")
**For Phase1/Problem1:** Doesnt this go against people finding and voting for their favourite apps - the incentive now is to find new apps and vary your vote each week. I think this goes against app creators who want to create a “sticky” app to retain users and retain their weekly votes. I think lazy votes really come from auto-voting platforms (vedelegate/governance apps). How will this technically distinguish someone who really likes say 3 apps and just votes on them week by week? Perhaps this should be analysed more imho My personal thoughts are that if you vote for an app you must be a “users” of that app. If your voting on an app and your not a user of that app, personally i think you should receive less rewards, and the app receives a lower vot3 from you. Where if you are a frequent user of the apps your voting on, you get the full rewards and the app gets your full votes **Phase 1 /** **Problem 2:** Fully agree with this… abstain to me provides no value at all and should receive lower rewards. Overall Phase 1 & Phase 2 are they 2 proposals not 1? ---
**Author:** ![YuichiHosomi](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex017/user_avatar/vechain.discourse.group/yuichihosomi/32/131_2.png) [@YuichiHosomi](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/YuichiHosomi)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2026, 6:56pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/5 "2026-01-18T18:56:21Z")
Thank you for raising this important issue around governance signal quality. In short, my suggestion is to redefine Abstain as non-participation, while separating intentional neutrality and alternative proposals to improve governance signal clarity. I’ll follow up with a separate comment to address the specific details from my perspective. ---
**Author:** ![YuichiHosomi](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex017/user_avatar/vechain.discourse.group/yuichihosomi/32/131_2.png) [@YuichiHosomi](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/YuichiHosomi)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2026, 7:11pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/6 "2026-01-18T19:11:58Z")
Personally, I feel that the current “Abstain” option may be a bit too broad. At the moment, “Abstain” appears to cover several different contexts, such as: - the proposal being difficult to evaluate, - not having fully understood the details yet, - intentionally choosing a neutral position, - or agreeing with the overall direction but feeling some discomfort with the final outcome. If “Abstain” were positioned more clearly as “not participating in this vote”, and intention-based options such as - expressing a neutral stance, and - expressing an intent to suggest improvements or alternatives were separated, it could allow each intention to be communicated more accurately and make governance signals clearer overall. From a behavioral perspective, even non-participation can be seen as a form of intent when it is clearly defined. Simply clarifying that Abstain / indifference = non-participation could already reduce a significant amount of ambiguity. At the same time, for intention-based choices, a light requirement could help ensure meaningful participation. For example: - a short explanation (e.g. 50+ characters) when selecting a neutral stance, and - a slightly longer explanation (e.g. 100+ characters) when suggesting an alternative or improvement. This structure may keep the system simple, while making governance signals more intentional and easier to interpret. Of course, clearly meaningless or spam-like inputs should still be subject to penalties. There are multiple ways such cases could be identified — for instance, through Navigator review (including minority opinions), or through community flagging mechanisms, potentially supported by small reporting incentives. While these approaches may increase development complexity and cost, they are implementation details that can be explored over time. Overall, I agree with Sunny’s perspective on the need to improve governance signal quality. At the same time, as some community members have noted, it may be worth reconsidering how “Abstain” is defined and expressed so that different intentions are more clearly distinguished. As an additional consideration, this approach could also work naturally when governance voting is conducted automatically. For example, when governance voting is set to be handled automatically, a configuration that remains unchanged could simply be treated as Abstain / non-participation. If the user makes any change — such as selecting an option or submitting a comment — their status would switch to active participation. In this sense, submitting a comment could serve as a clear signal of intentional engagement and confirm participation. With this structure, concerns that a large number of wallets (e.g. 10,000+) might be unfairly penalised could also be addressed, since only clearly passive, unchanged automated governance votes would be treated as abstention, while any form of intentional interaction would be recognised. ---
**Author:** ![Morb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/258eb7/32.png) [@Morb](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/Morb)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2026, 9:44pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/7 "2026-01-18T21:44:42Z")
> [@DaveL](#): > > How will this technically distinguish someone who really likes say 3 apps and just votes on them week by week? Round n App 1 33% App 2 33% App 3 34% Round n+1 App 1 34% App 2 33% App 3 33% ---
**Author:** ![DaveL](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/898d66/32.png) [@DaveL](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/DaveL)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2026, 12:19am UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/8 "2026-01-19T00:19:35Z")
> [@SunnyLu](#): > > recently they updated their voting configuration to me this needs expanding on… ---
**Author:** ![Morb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/258eb7/32.png) [@Morb](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/Morb)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2026, 6:59am UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/9 "2026-01-19T06:59:01Z")
> [@SunnyLu](#): > > ### **Definition: “Update”** > > An _ **Update** _ is defined as any intentional modification to a user’s weekly voting configuration, including: > > - Adding or removing one or more dApps. > - Changing allocation weights. > - Rebalancing percentages across existing dApps. > > Any of the above actions qualifies as a valid update. @DaveL I personally change my voting behavior on weekly basis. ---
**Author:** ![DaveL](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/898d66/32.png) [@DaveL](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/DaveL)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2026, 9:03am UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/10 "2026-01-19T09:03:46Z")
Is there any analytics to see how many votes (not through vedelegate) are similar each week. As i said above this is a disaster for x2earn apps, they want to attract and retain users and their votes, with above the DAO is rewarding them to NOT vote for their favourites ---
**Author:** ![Morb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/258eb7/32.png) [@Morb](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/Morb)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2026, 9:34am UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/11 "2026-01-19T09:34:19Z")
Broski, read one reply above yours. ;D ---
**Author:** ![Simone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/cab0a1/32.png) [@Simone](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/Simone)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2026, 3:19pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/12 "2026-01-19T15:19:41Z")
Personally, I understand and share some of the concerns around the treatment of abstention. In certain cases, users may choose to abstain not out of disinterest, but because they feel they lack the technical expertise or sufficient information to vote responsibly. Preserving space for this kind of cautious participation seems important for healthy governance. With regard to the _Freshness Multiplier_, I would welcome some additional clarification. Well-performing dApps naturally benefit from long-term user support, and it would be unfortunate if this mechanism unintentionally discouraged that stability. My concern is that, depending on its implementation, it could encourage frequent vote changes for incentive reasons rather than genuine reassessment, potentially creating friction for consistently high-quality dApps. Concerning Phase 2, I believe it may benefit from further evaluation. Existing delegation mechanisms already play a significant role in shaping participation quality within VeBetterDAO. Introducing Navigators could improve accessibility and convenience, but it may also mean that delegators are further removed from the decision-making process. Careful design will be important to ensure this does not reintroduce the same challenges Phase 1 seeks to address, particularly around passive participation and governance signal strength. ---
**Author:** ![SunnyLu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/eb9ed0/32.png) [@SunnyLu](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/SunnyLu)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 1:29pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/13 "2026-01-20T13:29:54Z")
It depends. I will try to get involved in discussions and clarify some concerns or questions. If it’s clear enough by then, we could put those two together into one proposal. Also, I need to check about the technical complexity as well. At least, to whoever read this, those two have to be put together to consider. ---
**Author:** ![SunnyLu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/eb9ed0/32.png) [@SunnyLu](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/SunnyLu)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 1:46pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/14 "2026-01-20T13:46:32Z")
abstain is still viable option for users in DAO - I think diminishing rewards is the way to encourage people to vote Yes or No. ---
**Author:** ![SunnyLu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/eb9ed0/32.png) [@SunnyLu](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/SunnyLu)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 1:50pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/15 "2026-01-20T13:50:11Z")
You still can vote for your favorite apps but also, the new rule will encourage everyone to explore new apps and give a chance to the others even just slight 1% allocation. Meanwhile, the benefits of this change is greater to address “lazy votes” problems which is majority right now - maybe a little sacrifice on your point (like from 100% to 99%) could address big problem - I believe ROI is great. 1 proposal or 2 proposals - it depends. Check my replies to Morb. ---
**Author:** ![SunnyLu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/eb9ed0/32.png) [@SunnyLu](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/SunnyLu)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 1:57pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/16 "2026-01-20T13:57:08Z")
I think the scenarios you described could be classified into two kinds: - internationally vote for abstain - Yes, that should be kept - that’s why I don’t intend to remove this option but just low the rewards - Don’t know what to do for whatever reasons - IMO, then you should vote for NO because any changes cost - human effort, treasury, time and uncertainty from the change. Then it’s better to vote for NO to take more discussion and deep analysis. And, plus, as BB mentioned, if there are users doing random casting whatever Yes or No just to maximize rewards: - the Odds will balance results - theoretically, 50-50 on Yes or NO will not impact the results. - That’s why the two proposals need to be put together to think - once the Navigator role is alive, Navigators will represent most of people to cast the responsible votes. - last but not least, the benefits is so obvious to address “lazy votes” issues as mentioned in the proposals. ---
**Author:** ![SunnyLu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/eb9ed0/32.png) [@SunnyLu](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/SunnyLu)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 1:58pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/17 "2026-01-20T13:58:31Z")
Good example - you are candidate of Navigator - help more people and earn your fees. ---
**Author:** ![SunnyLu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/eb9ed0/32.png) [@SunnyLu](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/SunnyLu)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 2:05pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/18 "2026-01-20T14:05:56Z")
Concern 1: about abstain, please check my answer to [YuichiHosomi] Concern 2: Delegators can make change in any rounds, it means if you don’t have time, expertise, or willingness whatever the reason - then choose someone you trust. And whenever you feel you like somebody else, then switch or just to vote for yourself. We will not remove individual voter but just add new role as Navigator to represent and help the majorities. ---
**Author:** ![Virus.exe.zip](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex017/user_avatar/vechain.discourse.group/virus.exe.zip/32/716_2.png) [@Virus.exe.zip](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/Virus.exe.zip)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 2:33pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/20 "2026-01-20T14:33:44Z")
I very much welcome the proposal. The “dead votes,” especially on vedelegate, have long been a thorn in my side. But I would go even further. 1. A distinction MUST be made between manual and auto voters. In my opinion, no manual voter should be labeled a lazy voter, even if they vote for the same DApps for eight weeks in a row. Manual voters actively participate in the DAO every week and should not be penalized with lower voting rewards if they do not change their selected DApps or their voting percentage. 1. Lower voting rewards for auto voters are all well and good, but in my opinion, they do not solve the biggest problem. Dead wallets. Wallets whose owners have died, whose seed phrase has been forgotten, or whose users have completely withdrawn. These wallets are no longer active users of the DAO and their voting power should be completely revoked. This can be achieved by performing a hard reset of the auto-vote settings every 4, 6, or 8 weeks. It is not too much to ask to reset your voting preferences once every 4 weeks. First, there will certainly be people who, after 4 weeks, think, “Oh yes, this DApp has convinced me lately, I’ll include it in my voting.” On the other hand, this removes dead wallets from the voting. 1. In my opinion, abstentions in proposals should also be completely abolished. For or against should be enough. If I actively participate in the DAO, the proposals should also be important to me. We are currently seeing a huge abstention bar from vedelagte at the end of the week. In order to get people more involved in the DAO and its interests, I think it is right to only vote for or against. ---
**Author:** ![Krish](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/c57346/32.png) [@Krish](https://vechain.discourse.group/u/Krish)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2026, 2:42pm UTC](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704/21 "2026-01-20T14:42:16Z")
To be able to vote (also in VeDelegate) a user must have completed atleast 3 actions the past 12 weeks, so there shouldn’t be dead wallets voting. Unless they have an upgraded GM NFT. Maybe better to make these rules a bit more strict, and have more action needed over fewer weeks? [Next page](https://vechain.discourse.group/t/vebetterdao-proposal-activating-governance-from-lazy-votes-to-curated-stewardship/704.md?page=2)