I would like to share something with you all. This matter involves several of our partners and contributors to the ecosystem. If this affects anyone’s interests, I sincerely apologize. However, for the sake of the B3TR ecosystem, we need to address this issue.
We believe that VeStation and veDelegate’s VBD qualification should be immediately delisted. Rewarding users through voting has negatively impacted other apps in the ecosystem. Every Better Action should be built upon meaningful contributions that require time and effort to support ecosystem growth. However, voters are already being rewarded for their participation. If they can also receive additional rewards through these two dApps, they are essentially earning double rewards with significantly lower effort compared to other Better dApps.
The concept of “Vote to Earn to Earn” provides far higher returns than the “X to Earn” model. As a result, users can simply stake B3TR into these two protocols without making any additional contributions.
Why we say these two projects is Vote2Earn2Earn?
voting is already a separate function within VeBetterDAO. B3TR rewards are meant for either the app or the voters. In this case, the app is the one rewarding its users. Voters are already receiving 40% of the total token allocation, and they should not be taking an additional share from the apps.
Allowing this would create a serious imbalance within the ecosystem. I hope this issue is taken seriously by everyone. In fact, I believe that past rewards should be reclaimed, as they have exceeded the intended purpose of BetterDAO.
I sincerely hope for your support on this proposal and encourage everyone to share their thoughts. We truly want this issue to be acknowledged, and I welcome anyone to DM me so we can work together to push this forward.
The “Vote to Earn to Earn” model creates an imbalance within the ecosystem by allowing users to receive multiple layers of rewards for a single action. While voters should be incentivized, additional rewards from dApps like VeStation and veDelegate effectively enable double dipping, making it unfair to other X-to-Earn dApps that require active contributions to generate rewards.
However, it is important to recognize that both dApps have made significant contributions to the ecosystem. These dApps have played a key role in infrastructure development and community engagement, helping drive adoption and participation. Their contributions should not be overlooked, and any changes should ensure that we maintain a fair but supportive approach to their continued role in the ecosystem.
Aligning with the White Paper’s Guiding Philosophies
The X-to-Earn model is built on three fundamental principles:
Meaningful – Applications should advance sustainability in some form.
Rewards should incentivize actions that strengthen the ecosystem rather than just extract value.
Voting is a critical governance mechanism, but additional rewards should be tied to efforts that drive ecosystem development.
Feasible – The application can record and reward user efforts.
The reward system should accurately reflect measurable contributions rather than passive participation.
If a dApp’s primary function is rewarding an action already incentivized by the DAO (such as voting), it may not align with the spirit of Feasibility in the white paper.
Valuable – Rewarded efforts should create collective value and contribute to sustainability.
The ecosystem should prioritize dApps that generate net-positive value, ensuring that rewarded actions have a long-term impact.
Incentive structures should be designed to encourage active contribution rather than reward passive staking or compounding benefits.
Conclusion
While VeStation and veDelegate have played important roles in supporting the ecosystem’s infrastructure and growth, their core functionality does not align with the intended scope of X-to-Earn rewards. Since their reward mechanisms primarily benefit users who are already incentivized through voting, allowing them to receive additional allocations contradicts the fairness and sustainability principles outlined in the white paper.
Therefore, these two dApps should not be in scope for receiving the allocations.
I agree that there is room for systems that support VBD without necessarily requiring an allocation. Platforms like VeDelegate and VeStation can continue to thrive and add significant value through their current model: earning a 10% platform fee on the voting rewards of their AUM. Meanwhile, other applications could opt for a pay-per-use model, much like the VeChainStats API or vet.domains.
I wouldn’t be too quick to criticize dApps like VeDelegate, VeStation, VeSwap, BetterSwap, and others. They each serve a purpose and bring value to VeBetterDAO. However, the core mission of VeBetter is to reward people for taking sustainable actions that aim to improve the planet.
In my opinion, the real issue lies in how these dApps are classified and rewarded.
Currently, the reward distribution per round looks like this:
• 20% goes to the treasury,
• 40% is distributed as vote rewards,
• and the remaining 40% is allocated to dApps.
It might be time to rethink how that final 40% is managed by creating a sub-system for dApp allocation.
The majority of that 40% (for example, 35%) should go to X2Earn dApps focused on sustainability, allowing them to compete among themselves. The remaining 5% could be reserved for service-based (non-X2Earn) dApps, which would compete in a separate category.
I completely agree and support this. Both apps—especially Vedelegate—have been highly valued by the community and have contributed immense value to VBD since day one. I propose establishing a third pool, allocating around 10% of the weekly distribution to DeFi projects or other ecosystem initiatives that, while not aligned with x2Earn, still generate significant value. This could include Dexes as well
By establishing a third pool, how do you intend to manage the snapshot of the users’ VOT3?
Should utility dapps be separated from X2earn, do users shape the vote with a single snapshot or as it happens with the proposals that are in phase 2?
What about staking within a dApp - which is essentially “voting in disguise” ? Im a big believer of calling things by the right name and “staking” just seems smoke & mirrors…
Following the recent discussions in this thread—especially after hearing perspectives from elcaliffo and others—and after giving it some thought over the past few days, I’d like to offer a more structured summary of my position.
VeBetterDAO’s Vote2Earn model is already the foundation of our governance participation and reward mechanism. When a dApp builds on top of this by creating its own Vote2Earn-like structure—essentially asking users to vote through the dApp itself to receive part of the VeBetterDAO dApp allocation—it results in double dipping.
This creates a structural unfairness. Regular dApps, which focus on utility and user value, are at a disadvantage compared to those that engineer additional incentives around the DAO’s existing model. It dilutes the purpose of the voting mechanism and opens the door to systemic exploitation.
After considering all sides, I believe VeBetterDAO should adopt the following principle:
Any dApp that leverages the existing Vote2Earn incentive as the basis for its own reward model, in a way that funnels users to vote through itself for the sake of gaining dApp allocation, should be ineligible for those rewards.
Clarification – What is not considered double dipping:
This rule does not apply to dApps that merely integrate VeBetterDAO voting or delegation features in their user interface for the sake of accessibility and UX, as long as:
The dApp does not offer additional incentives or rewards for voting through their interface;
The dApp does not direct users to vote for itself exclusively;
The dApp’s dApp Allocation is not based on capturing votes via its own frontend.
Such integrations are beneficial to users and should be encouraged as part of a healthy, open ecosystem.
Rather than just treating this as a one-time proposal for a specific case, I suggest we revise the current proposal to include this as a formal eligibility rule for all future dApp entries into the VeBetterDAO Allocation program.
This gives clear guidance and prevents similar issues going forward.