From Thought to Change: Let’s Reward Those Who Dare to Propose

VeBetterDAO
1

Dear VeFam,

I’m Roberto Califano, and over the past few months, I’ve taken time to reflect on several ideas that have come to mind. I often receive private messages from users saying things like: “This should be done to improve the DAO.” And I find myself thinking: “Great, you’re proposing something valuable — why not turn it into an official proposal and publish it on the DAO platform so that everyone can benefit from your insight?”

The concept is simple: the DAO is a decentralized organization. We cannot always wait for someone to magically solve the issues at hand. Each of us must be an active participant in the process of improvement and progress.

That’s why I came up with a proposal aimed at transforming DAO members from passive users into active citizens of this governance system.

Ideas have the power to change the world — and in our case, to improve our DAO. So why not incentivize them?

Here’s my proposal:
Let’s allocate 1.5 million B3TR from the treasury into a wallet managed by the Foundation, to be used exclusively for rewarding proposals that are officially approved by the community.
(A potential wallet could be 0x5D9A5f5125f96729CfF4adc97f7F6702F0206263, unless @VeChainOps provides a different address.)

In order to access this grant, proposal authors will need to meet a few clear criteria:

  • Open a discussion on Discourse to gather support and consensus from all key ecosystem players (Dapps – Users – Nodes);
  • Clearly outline what the proposal aims to improve or implement (feedback from the Discourse discussion should be used to refine the proposal);
  • When submitting the proposal, include a link to the Discourse discussion, your social profile, and the wallet address where the reward should be sent as recognition for your effort.

Here are a couple of well-written proposals to use as reference:

Before finalizing this proposal, I would love to hear from the community on a key point: What do you think is a fair reward (in USD) for those who dedicate time and effort to writing a high-quality proposal?
Some initial options: $500, $750, or $1000?

Currently, 1.5 million B3TR is equivalent to approximately $317,000 USD. Considering that only 5-6 proposals have been submitted so far, this fund could potentially support many valuable ideas for years to come. And if the value of B3TR increases over time, the impact will be even greater.

It’s important to note that, if this proposal is approved, it will not receive any funding itself. The grant will only apply to proposals approved after this initiative goes live, as clearly stated within the proposal.

Looking forward to your thoughts and feedback. Together, we can build a stronger and more dynamic DAO.

Warm regards,
Roberto Califano

1 Like
2

I think the premise of this idea is a very good starting point. People like Data take a lot of their personal time to come up with these ideas and think of every way to cover the ins and outs of each proposal.

3

I was only just saying yesterday that at least from my perspective that there is not much faith in the functionality of the proposal system. I only see foundation lead proposals pass and this “Restoring the GM NFT System” is the first community lead proposal to my knowledge to even gain support. This gives me a little bit of hope for the future.

I support this idea of yours as we need to incentivise more proposals somehow but the problem remains that the current structure discourages us from putting in the effort. There have been many proposals that should have got support and I have wanted to make one myself at times but thought whats the point. I will put all this time and energy in it only for people to not support as they either:

  • Are selfish and dont want to lose their voting rewards
  • See that the amount required to pass is too high and know no one else will support
  • Are benefitting from a problem we try to solve so either dont support or vote against

So unless we can change that, we need something like this to encourage people to try again.

Regarding the fair reward, I would say start high and see if we get flooded with proposals then bring it down accordingly or if at all.

4

I don’t think we can go off of the past, a lot of these proposals I’ve seen are poorly written, I don’t agree with the overall idea, or we are trying to write something better. As the foundation also said yesterday you can only put so much into a proposal to help it get implemented. They asked us to break these up into smaller ones. Some of the proposals people have added include 10 different ideas and some dont even start a discourse before submitting them.

5

On this point, I have to kindly disagree :grinning_face_with_smiling_eyes:
One of my proposals was also approved (I even included the link among the examples), and I definitely consider myself closer to the community than to the foundation :grin:
I remember that when there was an issue to solve, I took the time to listen to all the community’s suggestions — and in fact, I received great support from everyone!

Thank you for your suggestion — it definitely makes sense to start high and adjust if needed based on proposal volume.

Actually, a member of the Italian community gave me a great insight: instead of assigning the full reward right away (e.g., $1000), we could implement a dynamic reward system based on how much support the proposal receives in the final vote.

The idea is simple:

  • Each approved proposal starts with a base reward of $500
  • The reward increases proportionally based on the percentage of favorable votes, up to a maximum of $1000

This mechanism creates a real incentive to write thoughtful, high-quality proposals that gain wide community support. It rewards not just participation, but effectiveness and clarity.

Here’s an example of how it would work:

% of Favorable Votes Final Reward
50% $500
60% $600
75% $750
90% $900
100% $1000

For each percentage point above 50%, an additional $10 is added to the reward.

This way, the system becomes more merit-based and motivates proposal authors to truly engage the community, refine their ideas, and aim for the highest possible impact.

That said, I still firmly believe that even if someone were to act like an “opportunist” — trying to submit a proposal just to take money from the DAO — they would most likely fail.
If a proposal is poorly written, clearly self-serving, or lacks meaningful benefit to the ecosystem, it’s very unlikely to gain the support needed from all actors involved in the DAO to pass both voting phases.

In other words, the system already has natural safeguards — and this incentive structure would push even more towards quality, transparency, and real contribution.

Let me know what you think — always happy to improve this based on community feedback!

6

In principle I am for this. But are you saying you only get rewarded if the proposal reaches final approval, or if it just gathers enough support to go through to be voted on? Also need to consider could this be abused by a small number of bad actors. The rewards you propose would make it worth while doing so.

7

I thought it was clear but thanks for this clarification so I can reiterate and specify it better, the proposal must pass both votes and win the final approval, only then will you have the reward.

  • Proposal that gets support = NO PAYMENT
  • Proposal that gets support + Second round vote + not approved = NO PAYMENT
  • Proposal that gets support + Final vote + final approval = YES PAYMENT
8

Fair enough, I’ve seen the admin tag since I joined the telegram over a year ago and assume you’re in their close circle. But has that proposal actually happened? All we have from that is linear rewards.

Regarding the dynamic system, it seems unnecessary as no one will ever get 100% due to abstentions. The idea is sound but perhaps a different measure or scale? A proposal simply passing is a massive achievement in itself.

And this payment must not be automatic after passing. Give the foundation some time to review in case of bad actors.

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In overall I support the idea of financial recognition of those, who put time and effort for the betterment of the DAO. This might encourage more quality proposals.

To avoid abuse and make the reward appealing in different market (price) and ecosystem conditions (amount of voters and voting rewards), I`d consider a dynamic reward based on price, voting reward % and total amount of VOT3 needed for a proposal to pass the initial stage.
At least I’d put some numbers in simulation to figure out, if it would make sense at certain conditions for few whales to push a proposal for the financial gain.

Currently 3.7 m VOT3 would yield ~1.68% (62k) b3tr in voting rewards, while 1k USD proposal reward would be ~5.8k b3tr. So it does not make sense for few whales to push a proposal.

But, if the voting rewards decreased 10 times to 0.16% and the price drop to 0.05 USD, then 1000 USD reward would yield 20K b3tr, but the 3.7 m VOT3 needed for the proposal would yield only 5.9K b3tr. In this scenario theoretically it would make sense to abuse this reward system.

10

These proposals should aim to improve or enhance the DAO’s governance, participation mechanisms, transparency, or efficiency — not some operational matters.

Bonus consideration for proposals that show evidence of community feedback or collaborative drafting before submission.

The proposal should be realistic to implement, aligning with the DAO’s mission and technical capacity.

I agree with the post-approval review before issuing the reward.

Can be done in a quarterly manner.

11

I’m reading all your suggestions with great interest. I don’t claim to have a magic wand to solve every issue within the DAO, but I believe that proposal after proposal, we can make it stronger together.
That said, I’ve started considering an alternative approach to the one I originally had in mind.
Initially, I had planned to move 1.5 million B3TR from the treasury to fund anyone willing to actively contribute by submitting proposals to improve the DAO. However, since it’s not yet clear whether this initiative would truly spark greater engagement from the community, I’m now thinking of launching a lighter version of the proposal — as an experiment to study its real impact.
Let me explain more clearly.
We could start with a first test phase, setting a maximum budget of 80,000 B3TR to be moved from the treasury. I would specify in the proposal (just as an example) that from June 1st, 2025, to October 1st, 2025, anyone who actively contributes by submitting a quality proposal aimed at improving the DAO will receive a reward, based on a set of criteria still under development.
This way, we’re not moving a large amount of B3TR upfront, but we give ourselves the opportunity to measure the level of community involvement, track real data, and assess whether this incentive model effectively encourages meaningful participation.
If the outcome of this test is positive and engagement increases, we’ll have a solid foundation to build a more structured and robust final proposal.

12

Hi guys, here I am again, I leave you the proposal attached, if you have other suggestions write it thanks.

:brain: From Thought to Change (Test Phase): Incentivizing Quality Proposals with a Dynamic Reward System

:memo: Proposal Summary

Dear members of the DAO,
I am Roberto Califano, and over the past few months, I have been deeply reflecting on how to improve the governance process within VeBetterDAO. Many users have contacted me privately with interesting ideas, but these insights often do not transform into formal proposals. This clearly shows that the issue is not a lack of ideas, but rather low participation.

VeBetterDAO is a decentralized organization that works only if every member actively contributes. For this reason, I propose a test phase aimed at evaluating whether an economic incentive for valid ideas can boost community participation.
It is important to clarify that this proposal itself will not receive any incentive. The economic rewards will be exclusively allocated to proposals that are approved after this initiative comes into effect—provided they pass both voting rounds.

This proposal aims to:

  • Verify if economic recognition increases active participation;
  • Introduce a dynamic reward system, proportional to the level of support received;
  • Allocate a limited fund to conduct this experiment responsibly.

:open_file_folder: Proposal Type

On-chain Action (direct fund disbursement from the Treasury)
Text-only Proposal (policy for incentivizing participation)

:bullseye: Objectives of the Proposal

  • Encourage the creation of well-structured and detailed proposals by the community;
  • Reward those proposals that gain broad support, in line with a meritocratic approach;
  • Test the effectiveness of a dynamic reward mechanism through a limited trial phase.

:light_bulb: Description of the Proposed Solution

:bar_chart: Test Phase Parameters

  • Duration: Quarterly (to avoid any misunderstanding, I will specify the exact period when I officially publish the proposal on the DAO)
  • Allocated Funds: 100,000 B3TR, disbursed directly from the DAO Treasury
  • Fund Management: The funds will be disbursed directly from the Treasury, with no need for intermediate transfers to external wallets.
  • Incentive Recipients: Only the authors of proposals that pass both voting rounds (initial and final) and meet the established qualitative criteria will be eligible for rewards.

:repeat_button: Dynamic Reward Mechanism

The incentive system will be determined based on the percentage of favorable votes, calculated over the total votes cast (including favorable, opposing, and abstentions).

Note: The incentive, expressed in dollars, will be paid in B3TR equivalent to the corresponding dollar value at the time of disbursement.

:dollar_banknote: Reward Tiers

% Favorable Votes (of total votes cast) Final Reward
40% – 49.9% (borderline yet approved proposal) $350
50% – 59.9% $500
60% – 69.9% $650
70% – 79.9% $800
≥ 80% $1000 (maximum)

:puzzle_piece: Practical Example

Suppose that at the end of the final voting phase, a proposal receives the following results:

  • :white_check_mark: Favorable votes: 52%
  • :cross_mark: Opposing votes: 18%
  • :prohibited: Abstentions: 30%

The total votes cast would be: 52% + 18% + 30% = 100%.
Thus, the percentage of favorable votes, calculated over the total, is 52%.

According to the reward tier table, if a proposal receives 52% favorable votes, it falls within the 50% – 59.9% range, and the corresponding reward will be $500 (which will be disbursed in B3TR equivalent to $500).

:white_check_mark: Eligibility Criteria

To be eligible for the reward, the proposal’s author must:

  1. Initiate a discussion on Discourse to gather feedback prior to the official submission;
  2. Clearly define the objective and the positive impact of the proposal on the DAO;
  3. Include in the proposal:
  • The link to the related Discourse discussion;
  • The author’s social profile;
  • The wallet address to receive the reward.

:white_check_mark: Exclusion of Foundation Proposals

To ensure that the allocated fund rewards only genuine community initiatives, all proposals originating from or co-sponsored by the Foundation will be automatically excluded from the reward mechanism during this experimental phase.

With this integration we maintain a fair mechanism, which rewards community users, safeguarding the fund against internal Foundation proposals.

:locked: Safeguards Against Abuse and Incentive Disbursement Timeline

  • The proposal must pass both voting rounds to be deemed eligible for a reward;
  • Proposals that only receive initial support or that fail the final vote will not be rewarded;
  • The Foundation or a designated technical committee will conduct a post-approval review within a maximum of 7 days from the proposal’s approval.
    • During this period, the committee will check for any abuse or opportunistic behavior.
    • If abuse is detected, an official account of the Foundation or technical team will publish, in the proposal’s Discourse discussion, tangible data and a detailed explanation of why the proposal is ineligible for the incentive.
  • This system promotes a meritocratic approach, awarding higher rewards to proposals that generate strong consensus.
  • Additionally, the possibility of further decentralizing the incentive approval process will be evaluated in a future version of the model, as central approval—while acceptable during this initial test phase—does not fully align with the ideals of a decentralized organization.

:bar_chart: Evaluation Plan

At the end of the test phase, the following will be analyzed:

  • The number of proposals submitted;
  • The quality and structure of the proposals;
  • The level of community participation;
  • The potential for further decentralizing the incentive approval process.

The collected data will help assess and develop a definitive, scalable, and sustainable model.

:end_arrow: Conclusion

This proposal represents a concrete experiment to transform passive participation into active contributions. If the approach proves effective, we can establish a stable, meritocratic system that rewards those who diligently work to improve VeBetterDAO.
I remind you that this proposal itself will not receive any incentive, while rewards will be allocated to proposals approved after this initiative takes effect—provided they achieve the required consensus in both voting rounds.

2 Likes
13

Well thought out and clear presentation. When it comes to the reward tiers, is that % at round end or before veDelegate casts their votes :joy: We know over 50% of the final tally will be the afk delegators/abstain voters and can potentially throw off a highly supported proposal and knock the creator down to the lowest reward tier if passes

We’ve seen this happen in the last 2 community proposals that passed

Removal of VeSwap and VeStation from VeBetterDAO - VeBetterDAO

Restoring the GM NFT System - VeBetterDAO

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The reward system was the most challenging component to design. In an earlier version, I considered excluding abstentions from the reward calculation. However, after careful evaluation, I decided to include them. My reasoning is that a proposal’s creator should aim to engage as many users as possible—even those who might otherwise abstain—because doing so maximizes their chance of receiving a higher reward. Essentially, if someone is serious about earning the incentive, they have every reason to mobilize not only their active supporters but also encourage participation from Vedelegate users who might tend to abstain.

15

Agreed with dripsha on this one. Abstaining wallets will need to be changed in the calculation.

While I agree that yes, the proposal creator should try to sway as many abstaining voters as possible, there are just too many reasons to feasibly reach them. The abstaining wallet might be:

  • inactive
  • lost access to
  • bot wallet
  • farming wallet
  • alt wallet of an active user’s main wallet
  • setup by a crypto native person for someone who only uses the dapps
  • wallets with no social presence or identity

And so on.

I would propose weighing an abstaining vote at 1/4th of the total value, so that the recent proposals with give or take 41% approval, 1% disapproval and 48% abstaining would fall somewhere in your top brackets.

In addition, I’d suggest that foundation proposals should be excluded from the rewards. Only community proposals should be eligible I’d say.

Other than that i like it

16

Hello everyone,
I’d like to propose an alternative method for calculating rewards. After considering the feedback received, it’s reasonable to assume that the majority of abstention votes are passively cast through the VeDelegate service. Therefore, a realistic estimate of actively engaged abstainers—users who deliberately choose to abstain—might be around 5% of the total abstention votes.

Below you’ll find the details of this alternative calculation method. I’d greatly appreciate your feedback on which of the two mechanisms you’d prefer us to adopt.

[ALTERNATIVE VERSION]

:repeat_button: Dynamic Reward Mechanism

Reward calculation method:

  • :white_check_mark: Favorable votes = 1 point
  • :cross_mark: Negative votes = 0 points
  • :prohibited: Only 5% of total abstentions (“active voters”) considered, each worth 0.05 points

Weighted support % = (Favorable + 5% Abstentions × 0.05) ÷ (Favorable + Negative + 5% Abstentions) × 100

:dollar_banknote: Reward Tiers

Weighted Support % Final Reward
40% – 49.9% $350
50% – 59.9% $500
60% – 69.9% $650
70% – 79.9% $800
≥ 80% $1000

The incentive, expressed in dollars, will be paid in B3TR equivalent to the corresponding dollar value at the time of disbursement.

:puzzle_piece: Practical Example

  • :white_check_mark: Favorable: 1500
  • :cross_mark: Negative: 44
  • :prohibited: Total abstentions: 8200 (only 5% = 410 considered)
Total points = 1500 + (410 × 0.05) = 1520.5  
Total votes = 1500 + 44 + 410 = 1954  

Weighted support = (1520.5 ÷ 1954) × 100 ≈ 77.81%
Reward = $800

Which version do you think is fairer?

1 Like
17

Hello everyone!
Very interesting conversation! I like the alternative version instead of the original version. It can still be adjusted during the test phase or in the future according to the data.
This proposal will hopefully incentivise the community to partecipate more.

18

Hello everyone,
I’m sharing with you the final version of the proposal, which I will officially publish on the DAO starting from round 44. If approved, all proposals submitted between round 46 and round 58 (covering the experimental three-month period outlined in the proposal) that meet the listed criteria will be eligible to receive the reward.

3 Likes
19

I really like the latest version. Great work Roberto.

Looking forward to seeing it hopefully get support!

2 Likes