[VeBetterDAO Proposal] Restoring the GM NFT System Phase 2!

[mrwhittleman]

Proposal Summary

The “Restoring the GM NFT System” proposal by @databeforedishonor successfully implemented critical changes that aligned the GM NFT system closer to its original intent.

While these changes were essential and have shown positive results, there remain opportunities to further optimize the system to better incentivize community participation and GM NFT upgrades.

This proposal builds upon Datab4Dishonor’s foundation to create a more balanced, sustainable, and rewarding ecosystem for all participants.

This proposal addresses three key areas:

1. Optimizing the weight structure of all nine GM NFT levels to create a more balanced incentive curve that encourages users to upgrade and progress their GM NFTs.
2. Improving the GM NFT upgrade costs to create a smoother progression path for upgrades.
3. Implementing multiple mechanisms to continuously enhance the GM NFT reward pool beyond the baseline 5% allocation.

Key Changes

1. Enhanced Tier Weight Structure

Implement a progressive weight system for all GM NFT levels that creates optimal financial incentives to upgrade through the mid and upper tiers:

Tier Level	Tier Name	Current Weight	Proposed Weight	Upgrade Cost (Current)	Proposed Upgrade Cost
L1	Earth	0	0	-	-
L2	Moon	1.1	1.5	5,000	5,000
L3	Mercury	1.2	3.5	12,500	10,000
L4	Venus	1.5	8	25,000	20,000
L5	Mars	2.0	17	50,000	40,000
L6	Jupiter	2.5	50	125,000	90,000
L7	Saturn	3.0	75	250,000	250,000
L8	Uranus	5.0	250	1,250,000	1,250,000
L9	Neptune	10.0	400	2,500,000	2,500,000
L10	Galaxy	25.0	1,500	12,500,000	12,500,000

2. Enhanced GM NFT Reward Pool Funding Mechanisms

In addition to the baseline 5% allocation from weekly B3TR emissions, I propose the following changes:

• GM NFT Upgrade Funding: 50% to the GM NFT Reward Pool, 50% to the Treasury.

• Over-Allocation Redistribution: 50% to GM NFT Reward Pool, 50% to Treasury (for dApp allocations >20% weekly)

Motivation

While the “Restoring the GM NFT System” proposal made significant improvements, analysis shows that the current reward structure doesn’t provide sufficient financial incentive to upgrade to higher tiers. The cost to upgrade compared to the incremental rewards received creates ROI timeframes that are too extended, particularly for mid to high-tier upgrades.

By implementing this optimized weight system, reducing mid-tier upgrade costs, and enhancing the reward pool through specific funding mechanisms, this proposal aims to:

1. Create a balanced incentive curve that provides enhanced returns for mid-range tiers while offering substantial absolute rewards at upper tiers.
2. Reduce barriers to progression through the mid-tier range by lowering upgrade costs.
3. Improve the entry-level experience to encourage broader participation.
4. Establish stronger circular tokenomics by directing B3TR from upgrades to both active participants and ecosystem development.
5. Reward long-term commitment to the ecosystem while maintaining accessibility for new users.
6. Further combat passive participation and encourage active governance.

Optimized Weight-Based Distribution

• The proposed GM NFT weights are specifically designed to create:
  • A balanced entry-level experience that welcomes new participants.
  • Progressively increasing ROI as users upgrade through the mid-range tiers.
  • Strong financial incentives at accessible tier levels.
  • Substantial absolute rewards for highest tiers to reward long-term commitment.
• Rewards are calculated by:
  1. Summing the total weighted points across all active GM NFTs.
  2. Dividing the total reward pool by the total weighted points to determine value per point.
  3. Multiplying each NFT’s weight by the value per point.
  4. Distributing rewards ONLY to GM NFT holders who actively participate in voting.

Comparative Analysis: Current vs. Proposed System

Based on current ecosystem participation with the weekly reward pool:

Current System Performance (Current Weights, 222,000 B3TR Pool)

Tier Level	Tier Name	Holders	B3TR per NFT/week	Break-Even (weeks)	Annual ROI
L2	Moon	316	287.4	17.4	299%
L3	Mercury	25	313.6	39.9	130%
L4	Venus	208	392.0	63.8	82%
L5	Mars	80	522.6	95.7	54%

Proposed System - Current User Distribution (222,000 B3TR Pool)

Tier Level	Tier Name	Holders	B3TR per NFT/week	Break-Even (weeks)	Annual ROI
L2	Moon	316	92.88	53.8	96.6%
L3	Mercury	25	216.72	46.1	112.7%
L4	Venus	208	495.36	40.4	128.8%
L5	Mars	80	1,052.64	38.0	136.8%
L6+	Higher Tiers	0	-	-	-

Projected Future Ecosystem (250,000 B3TR Pool)*

Tier Level	Tier Name	Holders	B3TR per NFT/week	Break-Even (weeks)	Annual ROI
L2	Moon	300	35.81	139.6	37.2%
L3	Mercury	100	83.55	119.7	43.4%
L4	Venus	200	190.96	104.7	49.6%
L5	Mars	150	405.79	98.6	52.8%
L6	Jupiter	50	1,193.50	75.4	69.0%
L7	Saturn	25	1,790.25	139.6	37.2%
L8	Uranus	3	5,967.50	209.5	24.8%
L9	Neptune	1	9,548.00	261.8	19.9%

*Simulation with arbitrary # of holders and arbitrary B3TR pool estimations. Based on estimated holder distributions and proposed weights/costs.

Key Benefits

1. Balanced Entry and Progression:

   • Improved Moon tier rewards maintain attractiveness for new participants.
   • Reduced upgrade costs lower barriers to progression through mid-tiers.
   • Progressive improvement in ROI creates clear incentives to upgrade.

2. Optimized Mid-Tier Incentives:

   • Mid-tier levels show strong ROI efficiency (50-124% annually in the future ecosystem).
   • Creates a compelling incentive to progress through the tier system.
   • Break-even periods generally improve as users advance through the tiers.

3. Balanced Distribution:

   • Lower tiers receive meaningful rewards to encourage participation.
   • Mid tiers receive enhanced rewards to drive progression.
   • Higher tiers receive substantial absolute rewards to reward commitment.

4. Progressive Improvement Path:

   • Each upgrade provides a balanced combination of higher absolute rewards and improved ROI.
   • Creates a smooth incentive curve that rewards continued progression.
   • Users can see clear financial benefits at each upgrade step.

5. Substantial Upper Tier Rewards:

   • Higher tiers receive significant absolute rewards that properly reflect their substantial investment.
   • Creates meaningful long-term value for deeply committed ecosystem participants.

Expected Impact

• Balanced Upgrade Path: Clear financial incentives for users to progress through the tier system with enhanced returns at mid-range tiers and substantial rewards at upper tiers.
• Smoother Progression: Reduced upgrade costs make advancement through the tiers more accessible.
• Balanced Reward System: The 50/50 split ensures both the reward pool and the treasury grow sustainably.
• Treasury Growth: Continued funding of the treasury supports long-term ecosystem development.
• Community Activation: Higher rewards for active participation at accessible tiers will increase governance engagement.
• Ecosystem Sustainability: A balanced reward structure with progressive returns ensures both accessibility for newcomers and significant benefits for committed participants
• Improved Tokenomics: Creating balanced pathways for B3TR to flow from upgrades to both active participants and ecosystem infrastructure strengthens the overall economic model.

Conclusion

This proposal builds upon the solid foundation established by Datab4Dishonor’s “Restoring the GM NFT System” initiative. By implementing an optimized weight structure with reduced mid-tier upgrade costs, we create a balanced incentive curve that welcomes new participants while encouraging progression through all tier levels. This comprehensive approach creates a more sustainable and rewarding ecosystem that properly incentivizes participation and commitment, with progressively increasing returns for mid-range tiers and substantial absolute rewards for upper tiers.

Discourse Considerations:

During community discussion of this proposal, we encourage thoughtful consideration of the following points:

High-Tier Accessibility

The current proposal maintains the existing costs for the highest tiers: Saturn at 250,000 B3TR, Uranus at 1,250,000 B3TR, Neptune at 2,500,000 B3TR, and Galaxy at 12,500,000 B3TR, which may be prohibitively expensive for most participants. Our simulation of the future ecosystem shows that these tiers would offer lower ROI compared to mid-tier levels, despite requiring significantly higher investment.

Questions for consideration:

1. Should the costs for Levels 7 (Saturn), 8 (Uranus), 9 (Neptune) and 10 (Galaxy) be reduced to make them more attainable for dedicated community members?
2. Would lower costs for these tiers, paired with potentially adjusted weights, create a more balanced progression through the entire tier system?
3. What is the ideal balance between exclusivity and accessibility for the highest tiers?

The future ecosystem simulation suggests that very few users would reach these tiers with current pricing. A more accessible path to these levels might encourage greater long-term commitment to the ecosystem and create stronger aspirational goals for mid-tier holders.

We invite the community to discuss whether the upper tiers should maintain their current premium positioning or be brought into a more accessible range for dedicated participants.

This consideration does not affect the core elements of this proposal but represents an important area for community dialogue as the system evolves.

List of Changes

Modified Features

1. GM NFT Weight Structure

• Adjusted weight values for all tiers:
  • Moon (L2): 1.1 → 1.5
  • Mercury (L3): 1.2 → 3.5
  • Venus (L4): 1.5 → 8
  • Mars (L5): 2.0 → 17
  • Jupiter (L6): 2.5 → 50
  • Saturn (L7): 3.0 → 75
  • Uranus (L8): 5.0 → 250
  • Neptune (L9): 10.0 → 400
  • Galaxy (L10): 25.0 → 1,500
• Changed from flat linear progression to optimized exponential progression
• Created clear incentive curve with improved mid-tier returns

2. GM NFT Upgrade Costs

• Reduced cost for Mercury tier (L3): 12,500 → 10,000 B3TR
• Reduced cost for Venus tier (L4): 25,000 → 20,000 B3TR
• Reduced cost for Mars tier (L5): 50,000 → 40,000 B3TR
• Reduced cost for Jupiter tier (L6): 125,000 → 90,000 B3TR

Added Features

1. Enhanced GM NFT Reward Pool Funding

• 50% of GM NFT upgrade costs redirected to GM NFT Reward Pool
• 50% of over-allocated dApp returns (>20%) redirected to GM NFT Reward Pool

2. Balanced Treasury Feedback Mechanism

• Establish formal 50/50 split between Reward Pool and Treasury for GM upgrade costs and over-allocated dApps.

Unchanged Features

1. Active Participation Requirement

• Maintained requirement for active voting to receive rewards.

2. High-Tier Costs (L7-L10)

• Maintained current costs for Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Galaxy tiers

[Splendid]

Looks good, thanks! This goes some way towards redressing the (necessarily?) significant reduction in rewards for higher GM NFT holders that was introduced in the first phase GM NFT proposal. Any proposal that increases incentives to active DAO users to perform actions and vote will get my support and imo this is a balanced & sustainable compromise.

[reheat]

I’m fully on board with this proposal, @mrwhittleman - great job!

As for the high-tier costs, I think it’s fine to leave them as they are for now. We can reassess later if they don’t seem worth the upgrade. I believe they should require a significant investment and a longer ROI to ensure that users who commit remain engaged.

One question though: should we consider capping the weekly payouts from the GM NFT pool?

Here’s my concern - if a GM NFT holder upgrades to the Galaxy tier, 6.25M B3TR would instantly be added to the pool. That could cause a major spike in the following week’s payout, especially if the pool was previously around 225–250K.

Maybe we could cap weekly payouts at 2–3x the amount added from the 5% weekly emissions? For example, if the pool grows to 6.5M due to a Galaxy upgrade, the weekly payout would be limited to 500–750K.

[MonkeyDCrypto]

I see a problem with this proposal..

Problem
The proposed ROI for L2 Moon in the future ecosystem (37.2%) is significantly lower than mid-tiers, even at current user distribution (96.6%). While understandable as an entry point, it might still feel less appealing for new users/non-upgradable users. This, combined with the misleading “Break-Even” calculation, presents a significant deterrent for new users or those considering their initial upgrade.

The current “Break-Even” calculation of 53.8 weeks (for current user distribution) or 139.6 weeks (for projected future ecosystem) only considers the upgrade cost against the weekly rewards received. It crucially fails to account for the opportunity cost of the 5,000 B3TR spent on the L2 Moon upgrade.

If a user holds 5,000 B3TR and doesn’t upgrade to L2 Moon, but instead uses that B3TR to actively participate in governance, they would currently earn approximately 69 B3TR weekly

Therefore, the true break-even period for the L2 Moon upgrade should be calculated as:

Upgrade Cost/(Weekly GM NFT Reward−Weekly Opportunity Cost of B3TR Used for Upgrade)

Using your numbers for the current user distribution:
5,000 B3TR/(92.88 B3TR/week−69 B3TR/week) = 5,000 B3TR/23.88 B3TR/week ≈ 209.38 weeks

This significantly longer break-even period (approximately 209.4 weeks, or roughly 4 years!) makes the initial L2 Moon upgrade financially much less appealing with correct calculations.

Proposed Change (for discussion)
There could be an offer with a slightly higher introductory ROI for L2/L3 for a limited time (e.g., first month of holding, or even minimum of actions need for this better ROI for a month) to genuinely “improve the entry-level experience” beyond just maintaining its current appeal and make them more active in the DAO by doing actions. This could be complex to implement fairly.

This is more about perception and initial user onboarding. The goal would be to maximize the initial positive experience to convert new participants into long-term upgraders.

[Ben]

Hi,

Here’re my thoughts:

Multiplier Optimization

I’m supportive of reviewing the ROI structure through tier multipliers — it’s a great direction.

I think maybe we should also discuss total GM NFT quantity. Since the more NFTs that exist (especially with higher multipliers), the more diluted the rewards become.

Over-allocation

The idea of redirecting 50% of over-allocated dApp emissions into the GM NFT reward pool sounds nice in theory — but in practice, I’m not convinced it’s worth the effort.

• Last week, only 11,717 B3TR came from over-allocated emissions.
• With more dApps joining, over-allocations will probably become even smaller.

Upgrade Fee Injection

• Upgrades are unpredictable. This could make GM NFT rewards highly volatile, which is not ideal from my view.

Final Thoughts

From a design perspective, I believe the GM NFT reward pool should be supported by stable and predictable funding mechanisms. Volatile or irregular inflows are not essential to bake into the protocol.

It could also be more forward-looking to consider reward multipliers tied to participation in X2E dApps, creating a dynamic link between real ecosystem usage and GM NFT value. This approach could relieve pressure on Treasury.

From a technical and regulatory standpoint, we should aim for a system that can remain operational for at least 1–2 years without requiring major changes to smart contracts. Frequent upgrades not only increase the development burden, but may also trigger regulatory notification obligations under frameworks like MiCA. We have already started preparatory work on MiCA compliance, and keeping the core mechanics of token flows stable will be critical to ensure a smooth regulatory path.

In the longer term, the DAO Treasury will need to support a broad range of priorities — including token listings, grant, security tooling. Preserving and building Treasury reserves is crucial for the DAO’s resilience, and the reward system should be designed with this broader operational context in mind.

[Eritopower]

I oppose this modification for, at least, the following reasons:

Firstly, it is too soon to declare the previous modification a success. Less than two weeks have passed; we need to wait for it to stabilize before we can determine if it is truly successful. It is important to conduct a proper evaluation before taking further steps, or else, like this one, it would be a hasty move. In my opinion, we should wait at least six months before properly evaluating the previous change.

Secondly, making such continuous changes creates uncertainty about an investment. I upgraded my NFT level this week and convinced my father and brother to do the same just yesterday. Today, I regret it. With this modification, we will never recoup our investment, and not only that, but I fear that two weeks after this, there will be another change, and so on. Therefore, I will not make any further investments as long as this uncertainty continues and this proposal incentivise this, no investment.

Thirdly, these changes make it impossible to amortize the investment required for the first level (Moon). Considering the investment (5000 B3TR) plus the loss in voting rewards for those 5000 B3TR plus the fact that the B3TR weekly allocation decreases every four months (and thus the amount distributed among the NFTs) plus that the more NFTs there are, the more the reward is divided, it means that this investment cannot be amortized for at least five years. With a proposal every two weeks, it seems it will never be amortized. This will close the door to new upgrades as the starting point (Moon) is worthless. This is why I regret my investment and that of my family; I believe we have each thrown away 5000 B3TR. Never again.

Fourthly, I doubt that changing the framework of an investment so frequently is legal. Investments always require a certain level of stability, and the law promotes precisely this, otherwise investment is stop, that’s why laws protect the investment frame and enhance slow changes.

Fifthly, this proposal follows the same line as the previous one, reducing what goes to the Treasury. The Treasury is important for achieving things like listing B3TR on more exchanges. The larger the exchange (Binance, Coinbase, etc.), the greater the Treasury contribution required. Reducing the Treasury will prevent us from taking significant steps forward in the future. The Treasury will also be used to support new apps, which undoubtedly enrich the ecosystem and attract new users. With less Treasury, fewer apps can be developed, which will impoverish the ecosystem and consequently reduce the value and interest in B3TR.

Lastly, this proposal is only good for whales and nodes. For the former, investing is easy as they can obtain great level NFTs that amortize faster, and for the latter, because they get NFTs for free. For the rest of the users, the vast majority, this proposal is very bad due to the loss of Treasury, the decrease in rewards, and the generation of uncertainty in the project.

Honestly, this proposal looks like it was written by a whale or node, thinking only of their own profit, not the community.

[Elgen]

Either I’m not fully capable of reviewing the numbers, or you’re asking for nodes and people whom have allready bought a Moon NFT to significantly decrease their ROI, so as to make it cheaper for new users to also participate in increased rewards. Correct?

Whether this was the intent, or not, becomes irrelevant. The end-result is what matters here, and I genuinely don’t see why anyone would sign off on this.

Current APR for Moon NFT: 299%

Projected APR for Moon NFT: 37.2%

Even with an increased multiplier, it would take years for anyone to just breakeven on their ROI loss.

As with all other investment, first in, higher rewards. This should always be the case for VeBetter as well.

What is allready being pointed out as well, is the amortization period for the investment. The longer this drags out, the higher the risk for a new investor.

The proposal and focus now should be increased revenue for the system, that increases the treasury’s capability to inflate the value of B3TR - This will incentivize current users to maintain their level of engagement, as well as drive in new users simply through greed.

It is important to recognize that whilst greed is a fine motivator, the end result is still the same:

• Increased activity
• More sustainable actions that promotes environmentally concious living
• Promotion of healthy habits
• A positive spiral of revenue - sustainability - widespread adoption.

This continued change of the premiss of the reward system will only have a negative effect on anyone seeking to actually invest into the blockchain.

E.g you’re not coughing up $100k if you don’t know whether or not your 7% APR stays that way, or gets changed to 2% in the following 2 weeks, simply to «redistribute rewards» at a lower treshhold.

[mrwhittleman]

That’s a very good point. If we add 50% of GM NFT Upgrade Donations to the GM NFT Reward Pool, it could make it highly volatile to @Ben’s point in his comment.

@Ben - Do you feel that if we also created a cap of weekly payouts limited to 2x the amount of the 5% weekly emissions, that is something that is feasible and could be done at the contract level? I saw your note of your preference to not mess with smart contracts too much for MiCA compliance, but humor me here regarding this proposed solution.

[mrwhittleman]

Thanks for posting and sharing your thoughts, @MonkeyDCrypto!

I definitely 100% agree with you that we need to make sure that the Moon NFT tier remains attractive. That is my intention, even if it might be interpreted differently from my initial post. I want to continue to make the Moon NFT tier attractive, while also carving out a good upgrade path for the rest of the GM NFT system to encourage and incentivize people to progress upwards. Because right now we are a bit lacking in that regard.

Also valid point about not including the opportunity cost in the break-even calculation: but if we are to include the opportunity cost, we would also need to include the added B3TR received from the boost in normal voting rewards, since those are boosted from sequestering GM NFT rewards to a completely separate pool. Need to consider both this and opportunity cost, otherwise we are cherry picking what to include in the calculation.

I’ll see if I can crunch some more accurate numbers.

[mrwhittleman]

Hi @Eritopower - thank you for commenting on this Discourse and this proposal in particular.

I would like to firstly state that you are wrong in your assumption that I am thinking of my own profit and not the community. It is actually quite the opposite. It appears to me from your comments that YOU are the one concerned with your own profit on your ‘investment’ in the GM NFT.

The goal of this proposal is to carve out a better upgradeable path for the GM NFT tiers that make logical sense to do so, all-the-while still making the entry tier of Moon NFT attractive for newcomers. The second goal is to discuss ways in which to boost the GM NFT Reward pool beyond the baseline 5% allocation.

I agree that we should not be hasty to make changes. That is why we are posting this on Discourse and not submitting to the DAO yet. This is supposed to be a discussion, whereas you have already decided that this is a done deal. It is not.

So please know that we will take our time with this proposal, but that iteration is due to happen because it is a DAO.

[mrwhittleman]

Hi @Elgen!

Thank you for the comments and discussion.

To provide some clarity - the original GM NFT System proposal simply converted the Multipliers into Weights for the GM NFT Reward Pool (i.e 1.1x became 1.1 weight). However, this shorthand conversion did not factor in the cost of the upgrades. And it did not create a balanced GM NFT tier structure that incentivizes people to upgrade their GM NFTs. It did make the Moon NFT tier very attractive (299%), but beyond that little reason for people to progress through the GM NFT tiers and upgrade their GM NFTs.

The intention for Phase 2 is to adjust the weights of the GM NFTs inside the pool, as to create a more balanced system. I’ve adjusted the tables below to include the current numbers with the recent unlocking of the Jupiter NFT:

Comparative Analysis: Current vs. Proposed System

Based on current ecosystem participation with the weekly reward pool:

Current System Performance (Current Weights, 222,000 B3TR Pool)

Tier Level	Tier Name	Holders	B3TR per NFT/week	Break-Even (weeks)	Annual ROI
L2	Moon	320	285.9	17.5	298%
L3	Mercury	26	311.9	40.1	130%
L4	Venus	208	389.8	64.1	81%
L5	Mars	58	519.7	96.2	54%
L6	Jupiter	22	649.7	192.4	27%

Proposed System (222,000 B3TR Pool)

Tier Level	Tier Name	Holders	B3TR per NFT/week	Break-Even (weeks)	Annual ROI
L2	Moon	320	83.3	60.0	87%
L3	Mercury	26	194.5	51.4	101%
L4	Venus	208	444.5	45.0	116%
L5	Mars	58	944.5	42.4	123%
L6	Jupiter	22	2,776.8	32.4	161%

Perhaps the formula can be adjusted to lessen the hit to the Moon NFT tier, because I do agree that the entry tier should remain attractive for those that want to take part in the GM NFT system. Right now I do see the problem with the current formula of Moon NFT not being attractive enough.

I do feel that the overall ROI and break-even for all GM NFTs will be expedited if we encourage dApps to include GM NFTs into their reward tiers for their X-2-Earn applications.

[Eritopower]

Well, this proposal increase the amount of treasury going to the NFTs and at the same time virtually blocks people to upgrade to the first level so yes, quite look like a porposal of someone trying to increase the profit.
We are here investing, and talking about investment so yes, of course, I´m worried about mine as provably all users. People worried about the investment in a project is not good for a project.
By they way, you didn´t reply to anything else.

[Eritopower]

A proposal like this, which changes the return parameters for existing investments, should have a delayed implementation period to allow early investors to recover their investment fully or almost fully (5 months from my point of view). Furthermore, during this period, a notice should be introduced in the NFT leveling area, informing about the effective date and the change that will occur, so that users considering such an investment know what to expect beforehand.

[mrwhittleman]

I think I have replied to everyone on this thread so far. I’m sorry that it does not meet your expectations.

[Eritopower]

I’d like to point out that you specified the break-even point (incorrectly, I might add), so yes, the investment is clearly a concern for you too.

[mrwhittleman]

And I’d like to add that you are trolling at this point and failing to provide anything more constructive.

[MonkeyDCrypto]

@mrwhittleman

Adjusted weight values f

Yes, I overlooked the GM Boost pool, which depends on the extent of upgrades and contributions from the voting pool. However, as Ben mentioned, only 11.717 B3TR originated from over-allocated emissions last week, so the overall impact would be minimal.

To enhance the ROI for NFT Moon, consider implementing a Referral Program that transitions GM NFT holders into promoters. This program should be quadratic to ensure that higher-level holders, who already earn significantly from their NFTs, receive proportionate rewards (and maybe a verified vet.domain?). Here’s a proposed table:

Referral Weight Bonus Table (Optimized Quadratic Scaling):

Referrer’s GM NFT Tier	Weight Bonus for referred L2 Moon Upgrade	Weight Bonus for referred L3 Mercury Upgrade	Weight Bonus for referred L4 Venus Upgrade	Weight Bonus for referred L5 Mars Upgrade	Weight Bonus for referred L6 Jupiter+ Upgrades (per level)
L2 Moon	+1.5	+2.1	+3.0	+4.2	+5.8
L3 Mercury	+2.1	+3.0	+4.2	+5.8	+8.2
L4 Venus	+3.0	+4.2	+5.8	+8.2	+11.6
L5 Mars	+4.2	+5.8	+8.2	+11.6	+16.4
L6 Jupiter	+5.8	+8.2	+11.6	+16.4	+23.7
L7 Saturn	+8.2	+11.6	+16.4	+23.7	+33.5
L8 Uranus	+11.6	+16.4	+23.7	+33.5	+47.4
L9 Neptune	+16.4	+23.7	+33.5	+47.4	+67.1
L10 Galaxy	+23.7	+33.5	+47.4	+67.1	+94.9

This table can be adjusted as needed, but it’s crucial to ensure that Moon GM NFT holders are motivated to increase their ROI. Additionally, there should be a cap on the number of referrals to avoid the appearance of a Ponzi scheme . For example, Moon GM NFT holders could refer one person, Mercury holders could refer two, Venus holders could refer three, and so on.

[Ben]

Without diving into discussing the changes, here’s a quick note regarding MiCA compliance process:

Under MiCA, any changes to tokenomics, total supply, or holder entitlements — including voter rewards and GM NFT rewards — must be reflected in the official whitepaper and formally notified to regulators.

We’ve received inquiries regarding MiCA compliance status when we are working with listing partners. So we hope to complete MiCA compliance asap.

We’ve already prepared a MiCA-compliant whitepaper based on the last GM NFT proposal, it is currently under legal and compliance review, and will be submitted to regulator. Until that notification is completed, we strongly prefer not to modify any of these core parameters.

[ltcSpitfire]

Off topic but regarding MiCA compliance.. wouldn’t that require mandatory KYC, AML and monitoring of suspicious activity within the DAO?

[Ben]

In short, as long as the DAO itself does not provide custodian or exchange services, it is not considered a “CASP” under MiCA.