Implementation of a Fixed Staking Programme for the B3TR Token

Proposal Title:
Implementation of a Fixed Staking Programme for the B3TR Token


Hi everyone! A recent poll I ran on X showed that staking is one of the topics the community considers most urgent. Because no‑one had yet started a formal initiative, I drafted this early‑stage proposal so we can refine it together and turn it into a solid, shared plan.

Rationale
At present, many users and some dApps immediately sell the B3TR they earn from sustainable‑action rewards and weekly voting incentives, creating downward pressure on the token price. This proposal aims to incentivise holding and staking B3TR by offering clear, sustainable benefits for both users and dApps, thereby increasing stability and active participation within VeBetterDAO.


Goal
Lock an ambitious target of roughly 83 million B3TR via a sustainable staking mechanism, using a maximum annual reward pool of 5 million B3TR.


Staking Programme Structure

  1. Lock Durations & Dynamic APRs
Lock Period APR at Launch APR Floor
1 month 2 % 0.5 %
3 months 3.5 % 1 %
6 months 5 % 1.5 %
12 months 6 % 2 %

The APR of each pool decreases linearly as total staked B3TR grows, reaching its floor once 83 M B3TR are locked.

Dynamic‑APR details

Lock Period APR max APR min
1 month 2 % 0.5 %
3 months 3.5 % 1 %
6 months 5 % 1.5 %
12 months 6 % 2 %

For every epoch, the contract recalculates the current APR for each pool using:

APR_current = APR_max – (total_B3TR_locked / 83,000,000) × (APR_max – APR_min)

12‑month pool, practical example:

  • 0 B3TR locked → 6 %
  • 20 M locked → 5 %
  • 40 M locked → 4 %
  • 60 M locked → 3.1 %
  • 83 M locked → 2 %
  1. Technical Flow

    • Users deposit B3TR into the staking smart contract.
    • The contract mints and transfers VOT3 at a 1:1 ratio, allowing users to keep full governance rights.
    • At the end of the lock, users return their VOT3 to the contract and receive their original B3TR plus the reward accrued at the current dynamic APR.


Additional Incentives

  • GM‑NFT upgrade discounts tied to the chosen lock period, valid for the entire duration of the stake:
    1‑month lock: during this month you may upgrade your GM‑NFT to the next level with a 2 % discount.
    3‑month lock: during these three months you may upgrade with a 4.5 % discount.
    6‑month lock: during these six months you may upgrade with a 7 % discount.
    12‑month lock: during these twelve months you may upgrade with a 10 % discount.
  • VePassport score boost.
  • Extra rewards/recognition for dApps that keep their B3TR staked (details to be agreed with all stakeholders).

Resource Allocation

  • Annual staking‑rewards pool: 5 000 000 B3TR.
  • Target locked B3TR: 83 000 000.
  • Audit & Security: 1 000 000 B3TR will be transferred from the DAO Treasury to an operational wallet managed by the VeChain Foundation to pay for external audits (e.g., Hacken). Any unused amount is returned to the DAO Treasury after the audits.

Risks & Mitigations

  • Dynamic APR limits over‑issuance of rewards.
  • Suggest adding an “emergency unlock” function with penalties: staking remains non‑withdrawable for the first year, but the exit logic (burning accrued rewards) is baked into the contract for future flexibility without migrations.

Implementation Plan

  • Deploy a new B3TR staking smart contract.

  • Launch a live “Stake B3TR” dashboard on governance.vebetterdao.org showing total staked, current APR per pool and countdowns to maturities.

  • Run a transparent comms campaign across X, Discord and the forum.


Conclusion
This initiative will create a more stable environment by rewarding B3TR holders, strengthening governance via VOT3 and motivating both users and dApps to contribute to the growth of the VeBetterDAO ecosystem.
Note: This is an early, primordial draft meant to kick‑start discussion. Staking is a complex subject, and the proposal will benefit from the ideas and feedback of the entire community before it is finalised.

4 Likes

Implementation-idea to discuss – Weekly Voting Reward Multiplier

Right now weekly voting rewards are distributed purely linearly: whoever votes with more B3TR gets more rewards.
To make staking even more attractive (especially for small- and mid-sized holders) we could add a simple stake-based multiplier to those weekly rewards. The larger your locked balance, the bigger the boost – but with diminishing returns so that whales can’t dominate.

Below is a draft bracket system – numbers are only illustrative, meant to start the conversation.

Locked B3TR (per wallet) Weekly-reward multiplier
0 – 2 000 1,05×
2 001 – 5 000 1,15×
5 001 – 10 000 1,30×
10 001 – 25 000 1,50×
25 001 – 50 000 1,70×
50 001 – 100 000 1,90×
100 001 – 250 000 2,20×
250 001 – 500 000 2,60×
500 001 – 1 000 000 2,90×
> 1 000 000 3,00× (cap)

How it works

  1. Before distribution, each wallet’s voting weight is multiplied by the factor from the table.
  2. Rewards are then allocated linearly on these adjusted weights.

Why this helps

  • Small & mid holders see an immediate uplift (1.1–1.7×) that compensates for their lower absolute vote weight.
  • Whales still benefit if they stake, but the extra yield flattens out (capped at 3×).
  • Anyone who keeps B3TR idle misses out on the multiplier → natural push to stake.

Open questions for the community:

  • Are the bracket sizes and multipliers fair?
  • Should the cap stay at 3× or be lower/higher?
  • Do we need a minimum staking period to qualify each week?
2 Likes

Thank you for writing this up.
This is a great idea, especially when including the weekly voting reward multiplier. I believe this could create buy pressure as soon as the proposal is added to the DAO.

One question that comes to mind:
How would it be best to handle adding additional $B3TR to your existing stake, either with your weekly earnings or additional investment?
Just restarting the clock will not work very well, and giving the option to “boost” the rewards by adding in the last hour neither. The best might be to get APY and lock-up time on each add on. If technically possible that is.

Hi there,great question!
We can handle “top-ups” without breaking the system by using a multi-deposit, tranche-based model:

How the tranche system works

  1. Each new deposit becomes its own tranche with
  • its own start-time (the block timestamp),
  • the lock period you choose (1 / 3 / 6 / 12 months),
  • its individual booster (and GM-NFT discount) calculated exactly as for any other tranche.
  1. One wallet can hold several tranches, each maturing on its own date.
  2. In the weekly reward run the contract simply sums the weight of every active tranche: weight=B3TR locked×booster

Why this is fair and flexible

  • New B3TR start earning only from the moment they’re locked—no free ride on the past APY.
  • Existing locks stay untouched; their clocks keep ticking.
  • You can “ladder” your position over time (e.g. 1 M today, 50 k next month) and each slice is handled cleanly.

Concrete example

Tranche B3TR locked Lock period Booster Weight = B3TR × booster
A (today) 700 000 6 months 2.9× 2 030 000
B (+2 weeks) 40 000 12 months 1.7× 68 000
Total in wallet 740 000 2 098 000

Effective overall boost right now
740000/2098000 ≈ 2.84×

After six months tranche A unlocks and drops out; only tranche B (boost 1.7×) remains active until its own maturity.
This keeps the system simple while giving users full flexibility to add more B3TR whenever they like.

2 Likes

Hi Elcaliffo,

I have read your draft. Absolutly great add on for long term holding. Thanks for your work.

Maybe a short variant maybe a idea like 1 week for (adressing a broad scope of different users):

  • New users hesitant to commit long-term
  • Active traders or community members with short-term liquidity needs
  • Users wanting to “test the system” before longer locks

Also the combi with manual voting + staking bonus to incentivize voting would be great for adressing that challenge.

Looking forward to this draft becoming reality for the DAO community.

1 Like

日本語の翻訳共有です。

:japan:【日本語要約】B3TR固定ステーキングプログラム提案(草案)

:pushpin: 提案の目的

この提案は、B3TRトークンの長期的な価値を高め、ユーザーのエコシステム参加を促すための固定ステーキング制度の導入を目指しています。

:locked: ステーキングの基本構造

  • 任意のロック期間(1、3、6、12ヶ月)を選び、B3TRをステーキングすると年利(APR)報酬が得られる
  • 報酬は動的APRで計算され、ステーキング総量が増えるほど徐々に低下

:money_bag: APR(年利)の変動例

:wrapped_gift: 追加の特典
• VOT3トークンの獲得:
ステーキング時に同量のVOT3が付与され、DAOガバナンスに参加可能
→ VOT3による投票でも追加のB3TR報酬が得られる設計
• GM-NFTのアップグレード割引(ロック期間に応じて最大10%)
• VePassportスコア向上:Web3 IDとしての信頼性アップ
• 参加dAppsへの追加評価・報酬:dApps側もステーキングを推奨する動機づけに

:gear: 実装と安全性
• 年間報酬プール:最大5,000,000 B3TR
• スマートコントラクトの外部監査に最大1,000,000 B3TRを確保(未使用分はDAOに返還)
• 将来的に「緊急アンロック機能」も追加検討中(報酬放棄で途中解除)

:sparkles: 投稿者の意図(Califano Roberto氏より)

「全ユーザー層を巻き込む**B3TRの善循環(virtuous circle)**をつくりたい」

現在は草案段階なので、コミュニティからの意見や改善提案を歓迎しています。

1 Like

Another great proposal. We need more reasons to hold B3TR. As it currently stands, voting isn’t enough to incentivise holders.

I believe locked staking to maximise rewards is exactly what we need going forward.

Thanks again, Robert!

I think 1 month isn’t long, but that’s coming from someone who is well-established with the ecosystem.

I can imagine that it could be scary for new users, as you suggested. I think the aim should still be on longer-term holding, so I like 1/3/6/12, but I wouldn’t be opposed to a 1 or 2 week lock period.

The real question for this proposal is:
Should we remove about 15.8% (ATM has 38 251 650 B3TR Total; Annual staking‑rewards pool: 5 000 000 B3TR and Audit & Security: 1 000 000 B3TR) of the Treasury for this programme?

Every B3TR allocated to staking rewards is B3TR that cannot be used for:

  1. growth initiatives (Listings, …)
  2. dApp development grants (new Dapps)
  3. marketing (PowerSlap)
  4. future innovations.

The community needs to carefully weigh the benefits of this staking program against the significant opportunity costs. Is this a one-year initiative, or is there a plan for what happens next? I’m concerned this is merely a short-term solution when a more sustainable, long-term strategy is crucial for the ecosystem’s health and future. Nevertheless great iniative in proposing this idea as we have to solve the sell pressure somehow, and discussions should be taken. As it is now, this proposal would get a NO from me.

2 Likes

Hi,

Thanks for your effort.

I think this is a short-term proposal that will not fix much. Is trying to reduce selling while simultaneously increasing it with this 1,000,000 B3TR (Audit & Security). I guess this extra selling pressure of 1,000,000 B3TR (more or less) will not compensate for the increase in holders, as I guess those who will join are those who have been holding, as they have the B3TR, not those who have been selling so…really will compensate the extra selling? Can we see a massive dump at the end of the locked period?

Would it not be better and easier to just improve the voting rewards for long-term holders? Like the voting multipliers for those who have been holding. Something like a multiplayer for those holding a >X0% of their b3tr for last… X months?

At the same time, the treasury is really important to keep the ecosystem growing and to achieve new listings, which is important for the value of B3TR (uptrend in value incentivise holding). So, I’m not in agreement with new treasury reductions. It looks like all proposals target the treasury as if it is infinite.

And I would like to copy/paste @Ben comments from another proposal, which I think works for this one too:

“From a technical and regulatory standpoint, we should aim for a system that can remain operational for at least 1–2 years without requiring major changes to smart contracts. Frequent upgrades not only increase the development burden, but may also trigger regulatory notification obligations under frameworks like MiCA. We have already started preparatory work on MiCA compliance, and keeping the core mechanics of token flows stable will be critical to ensure a smooth regulatory path.

In the longer term, the DAO Treasury will need to support a broad range of priorities — including token listings, grant, security tooling. Preserving and building Treasury reserves is crucial for the DAO’s resilience, and the reward system should be designed with this broader operational context in mind.”

1 Like

We actually considered introducing staking in the early stages, but later removed it from the initial design due to concerns around the token emission schedule and potential compliance risks at launch. That said, I have a few thoughts to share:

  1. Taking lessons from the past, since this involves the tokenomics design, it’s probably best to consider staking, GM NFTs, and the voter reward system together, so that users have better expectation.

  2. From a reward distribution perspective, it might make more sense to leverage the voter reward pool.

  3. On the technical side, how should the VOT3 tokens issued through staking be handled? Should they be locked in a special way? And are staking-generated VOT3 different from the ones users get via the regular conversion process? If people can transfer them around freely, it could create weird edge cases or even loopholes.

  4. There’s also one thing I’m not totally clear: since short-term staking (like 1-month) is allowed, how exactly is the reward calculated when those short-term stakes mature?
    Here’s a more specific example:
    Let’s say in August 2025, user A stakes 30 million B3TR for one month. When they reach maturity in September 2025, the system needs to calculate their reward. But at that moment, it won’t yet know how much more staking might come in later during the year (for example, User B may stake 50 million for one month in December 2025). So how can it fairly determine the reward A should get?

2 Likes

Hey, thanks for your suggestion.
My concern with allowing such a short lock is that whales could exploit it to grab a high multiplier and then have their tokens free again after just a few days.

Regarding point 1:
Since GM NFTs are not incentivizing holding $B3TR anymore, and 25% of the treasury allocation goes to GM NFT payouts, I agree that they need to be included in the discussion.
As it is now the GM NFTs adds to the circulating supply instead of locking up more tokens, probably adding to the sales pressure of $B3TR.

Maybe an extra level of multipliers could be added for GM NFTs that stake $B3TR, and the extra rewards would be taken from the GM NFT pool. This would incentivize both holding $B3TR and upgrading GM NFTs, and it would lock up more tokens than it would free up.

1 Like

Hi Monkey, thanks for voicing your doubts. I’m protective of the Treasury too, so here’s why the numbers still make sense in plain terms.

1. Security audit (1 M B3TR)

  • At today’s price that is roughly 60 k USD.
  • A Hacken audit for a staking contract usually costs between 10 k and 60 k USD (It depends on the complexity).
  • We budget the upper limit, but we will spend only what is needed. Anything left goes straight back to the Treasury.

2. Staking rewards (5 M B3TR)

  • Each voting round the Treasury collects about 600 k B3TR in fees, sometimes more.
  • At that pace the 5 M we set aside flow back into the Treasury in roughly seven or eight rounds, long before the year ends.
  • Extra B3TR also returns when holders upgrade their GM-NFTs.

3. One-year pilot, future-proof contract

  • Locks are capped at twelve months only because we are funding rewards for twelve months.
  • The smart contract will let the DAO extend the programme or tweak the parameters with a single vote, much like we switched dApp allocations from 70 % to 100 % without redeploying code.
  • The plan does two things: it gives holders a reason not to sell now and it delivers a flexible staking tool we can reuse whenever the DAO funds it again.

So the headline “15 % of the Treasury” overstates the real cost. Audit spend will likely be well below the cap and the reward pool is basically recycled through weekly fees. We get extra security, less sell pressure and a reusable staking framework while keeping the Treasury healthy. Let me know if this clears things up or if you see other risks.

1 Like

Hi, thanks for raising your points. Let me try to ease the worries one by one.

1. “A 12-month lock will end in a big sell-off.”

We are starting with twelve months simply to collect real data: Who joins, how much pressure comes off the market, and whether the multipliers do their job.
The staking contract is fully parametric. With a single DAO vote we can extend the reward window or refill the pool well before the first locks expire.

To prevent a cliff we can open a second staking cycle around month nine or ten. Wallets whose tranches are about to mature can roll straight into a new lock instead of selling. We can even give a tiny bonus to those who renew so that staying staked remains the smarter option.
In other words, the twelve-month limit is a checkpoint, not a brick wall.

2. “Selling one million B3TR for the audit just adds pressure.”

A full Hacken audit for a staking contract usually costs somewhere between ten and sixty thousand dollars. One million B3TR (about sixty thousand today) is just a safety cap. If the invoice comes to, say, twenty-five thousand, we convert only that much and put the rest right back into the Treasury.

We can also cover the cost in stablecoins using the weekly fees the Treasury already collects, roughly six hundred thousand B3TR per voting round.
Even if we had to convert the full million in one go, it would still be a small fraction of weekly exchange volume, gone in a day or two.

What we get in return is an audited, bullet-proof contract—worth far more than that short-lived sell pressure.

Hope this clarifies why the twelve-month pilot is a safe first step and why the audit budget should not hurt the market.

3. Doubts about effectiveness
Here’s how I see it.

Remember, the whole point of VeBetter is to pull in web-2 style users—people who log in with a social account, never touch a crypto wallet, and treat B3TR like “points” inside a normal app. If every dApp adds a simple “Lock your points, earn more” button, even a first-timer can join the staking pool in two clicks.

Yes, at first the early adopters will mostly be the holders we already know. But the constant sellers will start to feel the pinch:

  1. Anyone who locks tokens gets a reward multiplier on the weekly votes.
  2. Anyone who keeps dumping stays at 1× and watches their share shrink week after week.

So the choice becomes pretty clear: either they stake as well, or they settle for smaller and smaller rewards. In both cases, the selling pressure drops over time.

4. Long terms holders
Would it not be better and easier to just improve the voting rewards for long-term holders? Like the voting multipliers for those who have been holding. Something like a multiplayer for those holding a >X0% of their b3tr for last… X months?

Thanks for raising that idea. A holding-time multiplier is a separate concept and doesn’t belong in this lock-based staking proposal. Let’s keep this thread focused on the current design; the holding-time approach would be better explored in its own discussion.

5. DAO Treasury
I’ve already covered the Treasury-impact question in my reply to @MonkeyDCrypto : audit spending is capped and any unused B3TR goes straight back to the Treasury, while the 5 M staking pool is effectively replenished by the weekly fee inflows. In short, the programme is designed not to drain funds needed for listings, grants, or marketing. If you’d like more detail, feel free to check that earlier message or let me know what still isn’t clear.

Hey Ben :waving_hand:

1. Bringing staking, GM-NFTs and voter rewards under one roof

I agree that the incentives should feel like one coherent package. One idea already on the table is Krish’s extra multiplier: your weekly voter reward is first multiplied by any GM-NFT boost you hold, then multiplied again by a factor that depends on how much B3TR you have staked. That single formula would tie the three pieces together and give users a very clear flow:

vote → reward × NFT boost × staking boost

2. Using the existing voter-reward pool
Point #2 really caught my attention. If the rest of the group likes the idea of funding staking directly from the weekly voter-reward pool, we could scrap the 5 M B3TR withdrawal from the Treasury altogether.

Could everyone who’s following the discussion weigh in?
Option A – keep the dedicated 5 M staking pool
Option B – use only the existing voter-reward pool with the new multipliers

If there’s clear support for Option B, I’ll update the draft accordingly.

3. VOT3 Management
Thanks for this point, I think I understand your concern and perhaps the simplest solution is to make the staked VOT3 non-transferable until the lock expires.

4. Point

1. APR is locked in at the moment of deposit

When a wallet deposits into the one-month pool, the contract looks at the total B3TR already staked right then, plugs that number into the APR formula, and “freezes” the rate for that tranche.

Example

  • 8 Aug 2025 – total staked so far: 40 M
  • User A adds 30 M → new total 70 M
  • Formula returns 4 % APR for the 1-month pool at 70 M
  • The contract saves that 4 % as A’s fixed rate

2. Rewards stream block by block (or per weekly epoch)

From 8 Aug to 8 Sep the contract credits A’s wallet with
30M×430 M × 4 % ÷ 12 ≈ 100 k B3TR30M×4
distributed smoothly over the 30 days. Nothing that happens after 8 Sep can change the rate already locked.

3. Later deposits get a new rate

In December 2025, total staking might have climbed to 120 M. User B’s one-month tranche is priced off that new total:

  • 10 Dec 2025 – total staked: 120 M
  • B adds 50 M → new total 170 M
  • Formula now gives 2.2 % APR
  • B’s tranche earns 50M×2.250 M × 2.2 % ÷ 1250M×2.2 while it is active

4. Budget remains safe

Because every tranche takes its rate from the real-time total, the reward pool can never be over-committed: the APR shrinks automatically as the global stake grows.

Bottom line: each short-term stake is priced once, at deposit. Future inflows don’t dilute past rewards, and the system never needs to “look ahead” to stakes that haven’t happened yet.

2 Likes

Hi Roberto,

I’ve been busy with B3TR’s MiCA white paper recently. But I want to share a few personal thoughts on the idea of introducing staking in VBD:

  1. My main concern is that what we’re proposing here isn’t actual Proof of Stake staking. That means there could be regulatory or legal risks — it might be interpreted as offering a financial product, which could be problematic.

If users are simply locking up token to earn a fixed or predictable yield (like 2% APR), then from a regulatory point of view, this can start to look like a financial product — similar to a bank deposit or an investment contract.

The key issue is that there’s no “work” or utility being performed by the staker — they’re just depositing tokens and receiving passive income. That’s what makes it potentially risky in terms of legal classification, especially in jurisdictions where yield-generating crypto products are heavily regulated.

  1. Therefore, on the question of reward funding, I personally lean toward adjusting the existing voter reward mechanism to deliver staking incentives. That might help avoid having staking classified as a financial instrument. But we’d probably need to run some simulations to better understand how that would play out.

  2. Another detail worth looking into is how the lock durations are calculated. Should 1 month, 6 months, and 12 months be defined as 30, 180, and 360 days respectively? That might help with consistency.

  3. And lastly, I think it’s important for the tech team to weigh in on these points as well. Their input will be key for implementation feasibility.

4 Likes

Hi Ben,
thanks for sharing your concerns related to MiCA regulations.
Assuming for a moment that creating a dedicated staking reward pool could indeed violate the mentioned regulations, one alternative could be to take the 5 million B3TR set aside from the treasury and distribute them evenly over 52 weeks (one year). This would mean adding approximately 96,154 B3TR per week directly into the existing “as voting rewards” pool. This approach integrates staking into our current reward system and avoids creating a new financial product.
However, thinking it over again, perhaps an even simpler and safer option would be to leave those 5 million B3TR untouched in the treasury to avoid releasing them into circulation altogether. We could still implement staking within the existing reward pool by simply adding multipliers based on the amount locked and the level of GM-NFT held by users.
Regarding lock durations, I fully agree with your suggestion to define clear periods in days (e.g., 30, 180, 360). It would certainly simplify technical implementation.
Lastly, I strongly support involving the tech team directly @Dan @vineet-codes . If someone from the technical side is following this discussion, it would be great to have your input on the feasibility and any other technical considerations!

3 Likes

I just saw that Vedelegate will offer a new tool to stake B3TR.
I formally abandon the construction of this proposal as it is no longer a priority.
I thank all the members who have interacted with this discussion for committing to finding a solution together with me :heart_hands: