[VeBetterDAO Proposal] Improve Proposal Submission and Support Flow

General
41

I’m not sure waiting until the voting round ends is necessary as they can’t vote with it on the proposal anyway and what if there is a new proposal they would like to support? I understand the need to prevent a boom in proposals but we could wait and see how the GM NFT level 2 requirement performs first?

What do you think about making the support phase deadline end just before the snapshot, so that if the required support is not reached the locked VOT3 is returned and can be used again? That way we dont punish the attempt to support.

42

Exactly. What if a group of whales push proposals on weekly basis and vote on them. Think about it.

Edit: But I do understand you. There are downsides - based on current low participation in proposal support, we might dilute the already low VotePower of active users.

43

Understandable.. but losing (at least i think) VOT3 for 2 snapshots is brutal.

It would require adding a new element but what if we had individual cooldowns? So that if you support one or more proposals in one round you must wait 2 rounds to support another?

44

This partly solves this.

45

Oh yes thats true, I focused too much on that exact post. All good then.

Failed support should definitely not be locked though. Just because it fails doesn’t mean it was inherently bad. In doing so could discourage people from trying, even if they believe in the idea.

46

The fact is that if we say “2 hours before the support deadline you can withdraw tokens” it would create 2 problems:

  1. Support is almost reached but you withdraw the tokens, so there is uncertainty
  2. Only fast users will be able to withdraw those tokens, creating inequalities in the next voting round, and making it a race to withdraw those tokens. Saying instead “from next round tokens can be withdrawn” puts everyone on the same level.
1 Like
47

No I mean that you cannot withdraw yourself, but the proposal fails to receive the needed support before the snapshot so it sends the VOT3 back automatically.

For a simple example:

Proposal ends Sunday 23:00
Proposal does not get enough support and is cancelled
VOT3 is returned
Snapshot taken Monday 00:00

48

that’s not possible with smart contracts unfortunately

49

I’m not that familiar with them. Could you explain how?

As far as I know, when using veDelegate I can give permission to take my B3TR/VOT3 automatically. So I assumed the opposite, i.e. to receive automatically, would be possible.

50

In that case veDelegate has a backend and its him triggering those actions, not the smart contract itself. This means that we would need to setup service to accomplish the same, which I do not like, because if something goes wrong or if one day the foundation stops the service we will be in the above situation of inequality.

51

Personally, another issue I’m seeing with the proposals, is that: since you are incentivized to vote on proposals to get rewards it’s basically impossible to fail quorum, because even if you do not care about the proposal or do not know what to vote you will abstain, just to get rewards, so every proposal will reach quorum in the end. In the real world when there is a referendum if you as a voter do not agree with it instead of voting against you can just abstain, because you know that by doing so it’s kind of like voting against because if a lot of people abstains quorum is not reached and referendum fails. While in our DAO this will never happen.

So does it make sense to reward proposals at all? Or, should abstain votes be counted in the quorum calculation?

For sure veDelegate automatically casting “abstain” on behalf of users that set and forgets it’s also not helping.

52

Alright then, well unless you have an idea that could accomplish it I guess I’ll let go of the idea. Besides no one else has brought it up.

I personally agree that it doesn’t make much sense to reward proposals, which is why I brought it up before. [VeBetterDAO Proposal] Improve Proposal Submission and Support Flow - #17 by ltcSpitfire I would also be fine with abstentions not adding to the quorum but I think if we should try to get automatic abstentions from veDelegate gone first. It’s really disheartening to see 7,000 automatic abstentions just getting rewarded come the end of the week.

1 Like
53

Ok, I think we can discuss quorum and the abstain issue in a separate thread as we previously agreed, and bootstrap another proposal for that.

I think we have enough here to go on with this proposal. Here is my draft of it.

Change the rules to create and support governance proposals

Proposal Summary

Spam and badly written drafts waste attention and delay legit changes. This proposal blocks low‑effort spam, forces clear wording up‑front, keeps the support bar reachable, and—crucially—lets VOT3 staked for support keep earning weekly rewards, so backers can support good ideas without freezing their yield.

Proposal Type

Specify the type of proposal:

  • On-chain Action

  • Text-only Proposal

Motivation

Right now anyone can post any proposal. Spam and badly written drafts waste attention and delay legit changes. We need guard‑rails that:

  • block low‑effort spam,

  • force clear wording up‑front,

  • keep support reachable for small holders.

Where the process breaks today:

  • Zero cost to post → endless noise.

  • Confusing wording → support stalls because no one is sure what is being asked.

  • Ever‑rising support bar → only apps with huge bags can hit it.

  • Long VOT3 lock‑up and no rewards accrued from the locked-up VOT3 → holders sit on the sidelines to keep future voting power.

Proposed list of changes

Added Features:

  • GM NFT level “Moon” is needed in order to create proposals

  • To submit a proposal there must be a thread in the discourse forum with an ETA of at least 7 days

  • VeBetter governance dApp should provide a B3MO AI agent to validate the proposal content during the proposal submission flow

  • A “List of Changes” section is mandatory in each proposal, categorizing changes as Removed, Modified, or Added Features.

  • A cap of 5,000,000 VOT3 tokens is introduced for proposal support; this may be re-evaluated over time based on token price, supply, and governance needs. This only applies when the dynamic threshold reaches the cap. Read more here.

  • VOT3 tokens used to support proposals will now count toward voting power in dApp weekly allocation voting rounds**** (allowing to earn rewards for weekly allocation voting during the lock-up period).

Modified Features:

  • VOT3 token withdrawal timing: previously allowed when a proposal became active; now permitted only after the proposal lifecycle ends (i.e., if support fails, the proposal is canceled, or the voting phase concludes).

Unchanged Features:

  • VOT3 tokens used to support proposals do not count toward governance proposal voting power.

Further clarifications

In order to avoid confusion, some examples to further clarify the reward earning mechanism and the withdrawal rules are provided below.

Support reached

A holder owns 100 VOT3 and supports Proposal A with 40 VOT3, while another Proposal B seeks its own backers.

When the next round begins the user can vote on Proposal A and B and in the weekly allocation. The following balances will be considered:

  • Weekly dApp‑allocation vote: 100 VOT3 (full balance).
  • Governance votes: 60 VOT3 (only the portion that is not deposited to support).

Outcome: the user earns the entire dApp‑reward share and part of the governance‑proposal reward share.

Note: same scenario will happen if Proposal B did not reach support.

Support not reached (or draft cancelled)

A holder owns 100 VOT3 and supports Proposal A with 40 VOT3, but that it never meets its support cap.

When the next round begins (assuming no other active proposals is present) the only available action is to vote in the weekly allocation, and the full 100 VOT3 balance will be considered, receiving the full reward share.

VOT3 token withdrawal timing

  • If support fails you can claim your VOT3 back in the next round
  • If the proposal seeking support is cancelled, you can claim your VOT3 back immediately
  • If the proposal meets the support you need to wait the voting round to end before claiming (2 rounds in total from supporting): proposal is created in round 1, must meet support before start of round 2, meets support and becomes active in round 2 (aka: people cast their votes), round 3 starts and VOT3 is withdrawable.

Conclusion

By introducing clearer submission standards, a reasonable support cap, and a fairer incentive structure for VOT3 holders, this proposal strikes the balance our governance process needs:

  • Quality‑first gatekeeping. Requiring a Moon‑level GM NFT, a public seven‑day forum discussion, an AI content check, and a structured “List of Changes” forces authors to think through their ideas before they reach the ballot box. Low‑effort spam is filtered out early, while well‑formed proposals gain early visibility.

  • Skin‑in‑the‑game without over‑penalising supporters. Supporters still commit VOT3 and temporarily surrender some weekly‑allocation rewards, but they no longer sacrifice all earnings and can reclaim their tokens when a proposal ends, is cancelled, or fails to reach quorum. That creates a meaningful cost for careless endorsements while removing the current “all‑or‑nothing” deterrent.

  • Inclusive yet protected voting power. Capping required support at 5 million VOT3 curbs the dominance of whale wallets and lets smaller stakeholders push worthy ideas forward. Meanwhile, VOT3 locked in support remains excluded from governance‑proposal voting power—preserving the system’s defence against self‑dealing—yet does count for weekly dApp allocations, rewarding active participation.

  • Future‑proof flexibility. The cap and other parameters can be re‑evaluated as token economics, participation levels, and governance needs evolve, ensuring the process stays responsive and secure.

Adopting these changes will streamline proposal traffic, keep decision‑makers accountable, and encourage broader, more thoughtful engagement across the DAO. We recommend the community vote in favour of this proposal to strengthen the signal‑to‑noise ratio, safeguard our governance, and empower every committed holder to help shape VeBetterDAO’s future.

References

This proposal was deeply discussed in the VeChain Discourse forum and can be found here.

Author Information

Date:

May 14, 2025

2 Likes
54

Having just read all of this, just want to tip my hat to all of you. I think we can all agree, this back and forth is a great example of how the beginnings of a proposal should work and why it makes sense to do so on discourse.

Looking forward to this one!

3 Likes
55

Edit: What about the “stake to submit” part previously discussed?

Otherwise I think it’s pretty much ready.

Do you think its necessary to explain this with just a little more detail? The way I understand it is:

  • if support fails you can claim your VOT3 back in the next round
  • if the proposal seeking support is cancelled, you can claim your VOT3 back the same day
  • the voting phase ends, you can claim your VOT3 back in the next round (2 rounds in total from supporting)
1 Like
56

This does not sound correct as currently voters receive rewards for voting on proposals.
Or am I missing something?

57

Ah good catch, that certainly wouldn’t be an “unchanged feature” lol

58

I thought we all agreed on using GM Moon as a criteria instead of “stake to submit”.

59

ok, will add that example in the propopsal.

60

Yeah I meant, VOT3 tokens used to support a proposal will not make you earn rewards, aka are not considered in your voting power.

Will rephrase that better, thanks

1 Like