Huge fan of the recent draft. Great work @Dan. The small corrections pointed out by @ltcSpitfire and @Morb I agree with, nice to get those corrected.
And yeah I was under the impression that the Moon GM NFT is enough to keep ‘spam’ proposals away. I still prefer that over depositing/potentially losing X amount of tokens per proposal. If a Moon turns out to be not enough, it can be changed in the future just like the 5M Vot3 limit would. I think it should be enough for the foreseeable future.
Thanks all, I updated the proposal by:
Ok fair enough, just came to mind.
Looks good to go.
Hi Dan,
Thanks for the response. updated to reflect the answer:
Using the similar example, User has 100 VOT3, deposited 40 into support a proposal in Week1.
What would the amount of VOT3 in his wallet, voting power for x allocation, voting power for governance proposal will be at different time?
Week1, after deposit to support - 60, 100, 100. (As snapshot already taken.)
Week2, proposal is up for voting. - 60, 100, 60.
Week3, before reclaiming tokens - 60, 100, 60.
For x allocation, it will always be 100, and for proposal 60.
As I said, I was proposing to change the withdraw limit just to avoid having a boom of proposals each week, so the same user cannot support new proposals with the same money each week. But I see how this is creating a bit of confusion, even if the change is just “postpone the tokens withdraw by a week”. Since it’s a small change we could avoid adding this entirely, up to you.
Hi Dan,
After internal discussion, locking the VOT3 token until week3 (as per the example above) will create burdens for the upcoming grant program (if it passes).
We are in discussion of creating a grant proposal track to better facilitate the program.
However, we will follow the current governance proposal process until it is done, having the VOT3 locked until it passes will slow down grant application process.
Suggest not to add this unless we find it necessary in the future.
Yeah it’s all the day I’m thinking about this change as well, and I think it’s better to not include this in the proposal and leave everything as is. Community is very active and we are under bootstrap phase, so it seems limitation to the dao evolving rapidly in this initial stage. On top of this, it just adds unnecessary confusion to this proposal.
If we notice that this is a problem we can always tackle it with a future proposal.
Latest version (without the withdrawal change).
Spam and badly written drafts waste attention and delay legit changes. This proposal blocks low‑effort spam, forces clear wording up‑front, keeps the support bar reachable, and—crucially—lets VOT3 staked for support keep earning weekly rewards, so backers can support good ideas without freezing their yield.
Specify the type of proposal:
On-chain Action
Text-only Proposal
Right now anyone can post any proposal. Spam and badly written drafts waste attention and delay legit changes. We need guard‑rails that:
block low‑effort spam,
force clear wording up‑front,
keep support reachable for small holders.
Where the process breaks today:
Zero cost to post → endless noise.
Confusing wording → support stalls because no one is sure what is being asked.
Ever‑rising support bar → only apps with huge bags can hit it.
Long VOT3 lock‑up and no rewards accrued from the locked-up VOT3 → holders sit on the sidelines to keep future voting power.
Added Features:
GM NFT level “Moon” is needed in order to create proposals
To submit a proposal there must be a thread in the discourse forum with an ETA of at least 7 days
VeBetter governance dApp should provide a B3MO AI agent to validate the proposal content during the proposal submission flow
A “List of Changes” section is mandatory in each proposal, categorizing changes as Removed, Modified, or Added Features.
Modified Features:
Unchanged Features:
In order to avoid confusion, some examples to further clarify the reward earning mechanism and the withdrawal rules are provided below.
Support reached
A holder owns 100 VOT3 and supports Proposal A with 40 VOT3, while another Proposal B seeks its own backers.
When the next round begins the user can vote on Proposal A and B and in the weekly allocation. The following balances will be considered:
Outcome: the user earns the entire dApp‑reward share and part of the governance‑proposal reward share.
Note: same scenario will happen if Proposal B did not reach support.
Support not reached (or draft cancelled)
A holder owns 100 VOT3 and supports Proposal A with 40 VOT3, but that it never meets its support cap.
When the next round begins (assuming no other active proposals is present) the only available action is to vote in the weekly allocation, and the full 100 VOT3 balance will be considered, receiving the full reward share.
By introducing clearer submission standards, a reasonable support cap, and a fairer incentive structure for VOT3 holders, this proposal strikes the balance our governance process needs:
Quality‑first gatekeeping. Requiring a Moon‑level GM NFT, a public seven‑day forum discussion, an AI content check, and a structured “List of Changes” forces authors to think through their ideas before they reach the ballot box. Low‑effort spam is filtered out early, while well‑formed proposals gain early visibility.
Skin‑in‑the‑game without over‑penalising supporters. Supporters still commit VOT3 and temporarily surrender some weekly‑allocation rewards, but they no longer sacrifice all earnings and can reclaim their tokens when a proposal becomes active, is cancelled, or fails to reach quorum. That creates a meaningful cost for careless endorsements while removing the current “all‑or‑nothing” deterrent.
Inclusive yet protected voting power. Capping required support at 5 million VOT3 curbs the dominance of whale wallets and lets smaller stakeholders push worthy ideas forward. Meanwhile, VOT3 locked in support remains excluded from governance‑proposal voting power—preserving the system’s defence against self‑dealing—yet does count for weekly dApp allocations, rewarding active participation.
Future‑proof flexibility. The cap and other parameters can be re‑evaluated as token economics, participation levels, and governance needs evolve, ensuring the process stays responsive and secure.
Adopting these changes will streamline proposal traffic, keep decision‑makers accountable, and encourage broader, more thoughtful engagement across the DAO. We recommend the community vote in favour of this proposal to strengthen the signal‑to‑noise ratio, safeguard our governance, and empower every committed holder to help shape VeBetterDAO’s future.
This proposal was deeply discussed in the VeChain Discourse forum and can be found here.
Name: Dan
Contact Information: https://x.com/agilulfo18
Vechain address: dan.vet
Date:
May 14, 2025
Seems simpler to me. I like it.
Just to confirm, the vot3 lock period in the latest version is simply just the same as currently, except you get rewards on dapp votes for the locked tokens too?
What did we come to the conclusion on regarding users being able to just support every proposal now, as they no longer lose rewards doing so?
yes, no change here.
exactly, but only on dapp votes, not on proposals
You will still lose part of rewards from governance proposals, because the locked VOT3 are not counted there, only in dapps allocation votes.
Right! Thank for the clarifications. No further questions, all good to go from my view!
change “is” to “are”.
While this is true, isn’t it the case for all proposals? Namely the fact all parameters can be re-evaluated at a later stage. As this is not unique to this proposal, I’d remove this part to slightly optimize the reading experience. Less is better in my opinion.
Other than that looks solid from my side.
I’m checking with @Ben around when is the best timing in order to submit this proposal.
In the meantime, I opened a new thread about the other issue we wanted to discuss: automatic abstain votes.
Thread link: [VeBetterDAO Proposal] Proposals Voting: kill automatic "abstain" votes
Proposal submitted: VeBetterDAO